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Cinderella’s Slipper: A Better Approach to
Regulating Cryptoassets as Securities
By CAROL R. GOFORTH*

ABSTRACT
The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) seeks both to protect
investors and to promote efficient capital formation, but in the context of
cryptoassets these goals sometimes collide. The SEC vigorously reacts to
fraudulent offerings of cryptoassets but has had to do so by forcing crypto
into an antiquated framework designed with very different interests in mind.
Even worse than the convoluted and complex arguments needed to force
crypto into the existing category of “investment contracts,” once crypto is
treated as a security, a host of onerous and inapt disclosure requirements and
regulations follows. Developers, promoters, exchanges, and others who
might assist in the sale of such assets are all forced into a regime that was
never intended to cover this new class of assets.
This Article therefore suggests changes to the existing regulatory
regime to more fairly apportion duties and responsibilities between
regulators, issuers, promoters, and purchasers. This Article suggests that
the SEC is the appropriate agency to oversee transactions in cryptoassets,
but the underlying legislation should be amended to create a new category of
securities, with different disclosure requirements and exemptions tailored to
the informational needs of potential crypto purchasers. Maintaining the
current anti-fraud rules will protect the public while allowing for innovation
in this rapidly moving space. It will avoid wasting assets of both regulators
and the regulated by eliminating the debate over whether crypto is or is not
a security and will avoid duplication of efforts between the SEC and other
federal regulators. It will also improve the relevance of available information
for potential purchasers. This approach has the dual advantage of facilitating

* Carol R. Goforth is a University Professor and the Clayton N. Little Professor of Law at
the University of Arkansas, in Fayetteville. She has decades of experience with corporate,
securities and business law issues in the U.S., and has recently published a number of
articles and blog posts dealing with the regulation of cryptotransactions. She is also the
author of REGULATION OF CRYPTOTRANSACTIONS (West Academic, 2020).
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both parts of the SEC’s mission: protecting investors while supporting
innovative capital formation for legitimate crypto enterprises.

I. INTRODUCTION
In the original Grimm fairy tale, one of Cinderella’s stepsisters
“cuts off her toes, and the other her heel so they can both fit into the
tiny glass slipper.”1 There was no other way for them to make their
feet fit into the shoe that was intended for someone else.
Unfortunately, there are some parallels between this tale and the
SEC’s current approach to cryptoassets.2 To date, the SEC has worked
to force cryptoassets into the definition of investment contract as
described in SEC v. W.J. Howey Co.,3 and to impose disclosure
obligations on issuers of cryptoassets and persons involved in sales
and resales of crypto that are ill-fitting at best.4
The mission of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) is
“to protect investors; maintain fair, orderly, and efficient markets;
and facilitate capital formation.”5 In furtherance of these objectives,

1. Zoë Triska, The REAL Stories Behind These Disney Movies Will Ruin Your Childhood,
HuffPost (Dec. 6, 2017), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/the-real-story-behindeve_n_4239730 [https://perma.cc/66FM-LAKU].
2. The first time the SEC responded to crypto, it called the new assets “virtual
currencies.” OFFICE OF INVESTOR EDUCATION AND ADVOCACY, SEC. EXCH. COMM’N, SEC
PUB. NO. 153, PONZI SCHEMES USING VIRTUAL CURRENCIES (2013). In an April 2019
pronouncement, the agency chose to call the same interests “digital assets.” See Statement
on “Framework for ‘Investment Contract’ Analysis of Digital Assets”, U.S. SEC. EXCH. COMM’N,
https://www.sec.gov/news/public-statement/statement-framework-investmentcontract-analysis-digital-assets (Ap. 3, 2019). This article uses “cryptoassets” or “crypto”
as more reflective of the terminology in the mainstream commentary on such assets. This
terminology is also more in line with how the rest of the world tends to speak about these
interests. As one commentator noted, “cryptoasset is a blanket term which isn’t limited to
cryptocurrencies.” Aashish Pahwa, What is a Cryptoasset? Types of Cryptoassets [Ultimate
Guide],
FEEDOUGH,
https://www.feedough.com/what-is-a-cryptoasset-types-ofcryptoassets-ultimate-guide/ (May 19, 2018).
3. S.E.C. v. W. J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946).
4. See, i.e., Carol Goforth, Using Cybersecurity Failures to Critique the SEC’s Approach
to Crypto Regulation, 65 S. Dakota L. Rev. 433 (2020) (forthcoming) (hereinafter
“Cybersecurity”). The SEC has itself acknowledged the difficulty of navigating between the
competing pressures of encouraging crypto innovation while adequately protecting
investors. Ted Knutson, Jay Clayton: SEC Balancing Crypto Innovation and Investor Protection,
FORBES
(Dec.
11,
2018,
12:22
PM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/tedknutson/2018/12/11/jay-clayton-sec-balancingcrypto-innovation-and-investor-protection/?sh=279ee4083bd9.
5. About the SEC, SEC. EXCH. COMM’N, https://www.sec.gov/about.shtml (last
modified Nov. 22, 2016).
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the SEC has been particularly active in asserting its authority over
transactions involving the sale of cryptoassets.6
Clearly there are legitimate reasons for the SEC’s concern about
crypto transactions. Crypto is an emerging technology that has
captured the public’s interest.7 It both involves relatively large
amounts of money8 and is subject to significant levels of abuse.9 It is
6. For a list of various SEC enforcement actions involving cryptoassets, see Cyber
Enforcement Actions, SEC. EXCH. COMM’N, https://www.sec.gov/spotlight/cybersecurityenforcement-actions (last modified Feb. 18, 2021). Note that the original releases from the
SEC talked about crypto as “virtual currencies.” For example, in 2014 the SEC issued an
investor alert about Bitcoin and “other virtual currency-related investments.” Investor
Alert: Bitcoin and Other Virtual Currency-Related Investments, SEC. EXCH. COMM’N,
https://www.sec.gov/oiea/investor-alerts-bulletins/investoralertsia_bitcoin.html (May
7, 2014). See also SEC. EXCH. COMM’N, OFFICE OF INVESTOR EDUCATION AND ADVOCACY,
SEC PUB. NO. 153, PONZI SCHEMES USING VIRTUAL CURRENCIES (July 1, 2013). More
recently, the SEC has apparently switched to using “Digital Assets.” SEC. EXCH. COMM’N,
FRAMEWORK FOR “INVESTMENT CONTRACT” ANALYSIS OF DIGITAL ASSETS (last visited Feb.
21, 2021) [hereinafter Framework]. In a joint staff statement (issued with the Office of
General Counsel for FINRA), the SEC referred to covered cryptoassets as “digital asset
securities.” See Joint Staff Statement on Broker-Dealer Custody of Digital Asset Securities, SEC.
EXCH. COMM’N, https://www.sec.gov/news/public-statement/joint-staff-statementbroker-dealer-custody-digital-asset-securities, (July 8, 2019) [hereinafter Digital Asset
Securities].
7. For example, some commentators compare the development of cryptoassets to
the internet. “[M]any pundits, both in and out of the crypto ecosystem, have likened
Bitcoin’s parabolic rally in 2017 to the Dotcom Boom and Bust at the turn of the millennia.
Sure, there are similarities, like the fact that both industries were revolutionary, were
initially misunderstood and hated, and were rife with bad actors looking only to turn a
quick buck.” Nick Chong, Crypto Adoption is Like Internet in 1990s With 50M+ Users,
Massive Potential Left, NEWSBTC, https://www.newsbtc.com/news/crypto-adoption-islike-internet-in-1990s-with-50m-users-massive-potential-left/ (Apr. 25, 2019).
8. “The amount of money that ICOs have raised over the last two years is truly
astonishing. In 2017, ICOs raised a total of $5.6 billion.” The Initial Coin Offering gold rush
– the future of fundraising or just another crypto scam? BLOCKGEEKS, (updated Feb. 21, 2019),
[https://perma.cc/QEB7-DF3W].
9. To discover the range of fraudulent activities that have occurred in the context of
crypto-offerings, one need look no further than the numerous SEC warnings and actions
involving fraudulent crypto offerings. Investor.gov, Investor Bulletin: Initial Coin Offerings,
SEC. EXCH. COMM’N (July 25, 2017), https://www.investor.gov/introductioninvesting/general-resources/news-alerts/alerts-bulletins/investor-bulletins-16;
Investor.gov, Investor Alert: Public Companies Making ICO-Related Claims, SEC. EXCH.
COMM’N (Aug. 28, 2017), https://www.investor.gov/introduction-investing/generalresources/news-alerts/alerts-bulletins/investor-alerts/investor-25;
Investor.gov,
Investor Alert: Celebrity Endorsements, SEC. EXCH. COMM’N (Nov. 1, 2017),
https://www.investor.gov/introduction-investing/general-resources/newsalerts/alerts-bulletins/investor-alerts/investor-22; Statement on Cryptocurrencies and
Initial Coin Offerings, SEC. EXCH. COMM’N, https://www.sec.gov/news/publicstatement/statement-clayton-2017-12-11#_ftnref8 (Dec. 11, 2017); The SEC has an
Opportunity You Won’t Want to Miss: Act Now!, SEC. EXCH. COMM’N,
https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2018-88 (May 16, 2018); Investor.gov, Watch
Out For False Claims About SEC And CFTC Endorsements Used To Promote Digital Asset
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therefore completely understandable that the SEC wants to protect
the investing public from the fraud that, at times, has seemed to
permeate transactions involving cryptoassets.10
However, because the federal securities laws were not designed
to apply to cryptoassets, and do not identify anything like crypto as
being within the ambit of the securities statutes, the only option for
the SEC has been to treat crypto as “investment contracts,” one of the
catch-all phrases contained in the federal securities laws’ definition of
security.11 Cryptoassets, unfortunately, do not fit easily into this
framework, with the SEC’s explanation of how to apply this test
changing rather significantly in a relatively short period of time.12
Moreover, the SEC is (as of the date this Article was written) involved
in major litigation over this approach to crypto as an investment
contract.13
The SEC insists that it looks at all facts and circumstances under
the Howey test,14 which requires an investment in a common
Investments,
SEC.
EXCH.
COMM’N
(Oct.
11,
2018),
https://www.investor.gov/introduction-investing/general-resources/newsalerts/alerts-bulletins/investor-alerts/investor-10.
10. For example, one study reported that 80% of initial coin offerings (ICOs)
conducted in 2017 were fraudulent. Ana Alexandre, New Study Says 80 Percent of ICOs
Conducted
in
2017
Were
Scams,
COINTELEGRAPH
(July
13,
2018),
https://cointelegraph.com/news/new-study-says-80-percent-of-icos-conducted-in2017-were-scams. The SEC appears to recognize these risks, steadily maintaining that
crypto enforcement is one of its priorities. See, e.g., William Suberg, SEC Chairman Flags
Crypto as Continued Regulatory Focus in Latest Speech, COINTELEGRAPH (Apr. 10, 2019),
https://cointelegraph.com/news/sec-chairman-flags-crypto-as-continued-regulatoryfocus-in-latest-speech.
11. See, e.g., Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, title I, § 2, 48 Stat. 74 (codified as amended
at 15 U.S.C. § 77b (2006)); Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, title I, § 3, 48 Stat. 882
(codified as amended 15 U.S.C. § 78c (2006)).
12. For a discussion of how the SEC’s position has had to evolve rapidly, see infra Part
II.A.
13. On December 22, 2020, the SEC initiated what may be one of the most significant
crypto enforcement cases to date. The commission filed a complaint against Ripple Labs
and two insiders, Brad Garlinghouse and Chris Larsen, the current and former C.E.O.’s of
the company. SEC v. Ripple Labs, Inc., 20 Civ. 10832, Complaint (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 22, 2020).
The lawsuit alleges that the XRP token that has been in circulation since 2013 is a security,
and the Ripple’s ongoing sales have been illegal because of a failure to register them. See
Carol Goforth, SEC vs. Ripple: A predictable but undesirable development, COINTELEGRAPH
(Dec. 27, 2020), https://cointelegraph.com/news/sec-vs-ripple-a-predictable-butundesirable-development [https://perma.cc/XBT6-3LWP]. According to reports, the
case is not likely to settle. Tanzeel Akhtar, Ripple, SEC Say Settlement Unlikely Before Trial
Over
Alleged
Securities
Violations,
COINDESK
(Feb.
16,
2021),
https://www.coindesk.com/ripple-sec-say-settlement-unlikely-before-trial-overalleged-securities-violations [https://perma.cc/MJN7-BBXG].
14. This test comes from S.E.C v. W. J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946).
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enterprise where the purchasers are hoping for profits based on the
essential entrepreneurial efforts of others.15 In reality, however, the
SEC has a pronounced tendency to conclude that almost all
cryptoassets are securities. This, in turn, means that persons who seek
to offer such assets for sale are being forced into the existing
registration regime unless an appropriate exemption for the sale can
be found.16 In essence, this often subjects sellers to burdensome
disclosure and reporting obligations.17 In fact, compliance is so
burdensome that the existing paradigm runs the risk of stifling
desirable innovation.18 This is especially likely in the context of
crypto-based offerings because of the extensive regulations imposed
by other federal agencies such as the I.R.S. (which classifies crypto as
property rather than a security),19 the Commodities Futures Trading
Commissions (CFTC) (which says crypto is a commodity),20 and the
Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) (which treats
crypto as a virtual currency).21 This does not even consider the
15. See infra notes 28-35 for a more thorough discussion of the Howey test.
16. Section 5 of the Securities Act of 1933 (codified as amended 15 U.S.C. § 77e (2006))
prohibits the offer or sale of securities unless they are first registered with the SEC or an
exemption from registration is available.
17. See Cybersecurity, supra note 4.
18. This is so even if there is only the risk that the securities laws will be found to
apply. Thus, when the SEC issues a Framework, see supra note 6, with 38 distinct
considerations, many of which have subparts and some of which focus on the manner of
distribution rather than the asset being distributed, the concern over which interests will
be subject to the disclosure obligations can by itself be overly burdensome. SEC
Commissioner Hester Peirce shared this concern in remarks made at a May 2019 SEC
Enforcement Forum. Comm’r Hester M. Peirce, How We Howey, SEC. EXCH. COMM’N (May
9, 2019), https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/peirce-how-we-howey-050919 [hereinafter
Peirce Speech].
19. The I.R.S. announced in March 2014 that “[f]or federal tax purposes, virtual
currency
is
treated
as
property.”
Virtual
Currency
Guidance,
I.R.S.,
https://www.irs.gov/irb/2014-16_IRB#NOT-2014-21 (Apr. 14, 2014). In its most recent
pronouncement on the subject, dealing with airdrops and forks, the agency continued this
general approach. See I.R.S. Rev. Rul. 2019-24, 26 C.F.R. 1.61-1.
20. The CFTC first asserted jurisdiction over Bitcoin in 2015. Release Number 7231-15,
U.S. COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMM’N, (Sept. 17, 2015), [https://perma.cc/J7Z76JFG]. It did so more recently in a potential cryptocurrency offering that involved no
future contract or swap. Keith Miller, Andrew P. Cross, and J. Dax Hansen, CFTC Flexes
Its Regulatory Muscle in a Case Involving a Virtual Currency, VIRTUAL CURRENCY REPORT,
https://www.virtualcurrencyreport.com/2018/01/cftc-flexes-its-regulatory-muscle-ina-case-involving-a-virtual-currency/ (Jan. 29, 2018).
21. FinCEN was one of the earliest regulatory actors in the crypto space, taking the
position that the Bank Secrecy Act provisions applied to persons involved in certain
transactions in “virtual currencies.” See Application of FinCEN’s Regulations to Persons
Administering, Exchanging, or Using Virtual Currencies, FIN. CRIMES ENF’T NETWORK,
https://www.fincen.gov/resources/statutes-regulations/guidance/application-fincensregulations-persons-administering (Mar. 18, 2013). More recently, this approach was
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involvement of state tax, securities, and banking authorities, many of
which also regulate crypto.22
The focus of this Article is on how best to utilize the SEC’s
considerable expertise and resources in addressing problems posed
by the creation and sale of cryptoassets.23 Following this introduction,
Part II describes the regulatory paradigm in which the SEC operates,
including an exploration of how that regime has been applied to
crypto. Part III then evaluates how well this system is working in the
context of cryptoassets. Part IV considers some of the other
suggestions for change that have been made, and Part V presents an
alternative approach to regulation designed to strike a balance
between the need to protect the public and the need to facilitate
capital formation and innovation. The Conclusion reminds readers of
why change is needed and why the suggestions in this Article could
benefit regulators, entrepreneurs, and the public.

II. REGULATION OF CRYPTO IN THE CURRENT
SYSTEM
A. CRYPTO AS A SECURITY

refined but essentially continued. FIN. CRIMES ENF’T NETWORK, U.S. TREASURY, FIN-2019G001, APPLICATION OF FINCEN’S REGULATIONS TO CERTAIN BUSINESS MODELS INVOLVING
CONVERTIBLE VIRTUAL CURRENCIES (2019).
22. Most commonly, state involvement with crypto focuses on the issue of whether
crypto-based businesses are money transmitters. For a comparison of how states approach
crypto regulation, see Frederick Reese, Bitcoin Regulation by State (Updated 2018), BITCOIN
MARKET
JOURNAL
(Aug.
4,
2017,
9:49
PM),
https://www.bitcoinmarketjournal.com/bitcoin-state-regulations/. However, state
securities officials can also be involved. For example, in November 2018, “[t]he Securities
Commissioner of the U.S. State of Texas … issued an Emergency Cease and Desist
Order … against crypto investment firm My Crypto Mine and its principal Mark Steven
Royer.” Marie Huillet, Texas Securities Commissioner Issues Cease and Desist Order to Crypto
Investment
Firm,
COINTELEGRAPH
(Nov.
28,
2018),
https://cointelegraph.com/news/texas-securities-commissioner-issues-cease-anddesist-order-to-crypto-investment-firm.
23. This Article assumes a basic familiarity with cryptoassets and blockchain, and
therefore does not include an extended explanation of these terms and concepts. There are
now several other articles that can provide this kind of background. For a consideration
of important terminology relating to cryptoassets, see Carol Goforth, The Lawyer’s
Cryptionary: A Resource for Talking to Clients About Crypto-Transactions, 41 CAMPBELL L.
REV. 47 (2019). For a more general discussion of how crypto and how the U.S. securities
laws have been applied, albeit before the most recent pronouncements from the SEC, see
Carol Goforth, Securities Treatment of Tokenized Offerings Under U.S. Law, 46 PEPP. L. REV.
405 (2019), and Thomas Lee Hazen, Tulips, Oranges, Worms, and Coins - Virtual, Digital, or
Crypto Currency and the Securities Laws, 20 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 493 (2019).
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In very general terms, the most important piece of legislation for
persons seeking to sell securities is the Securities Act of 1933 (the ‘33
Act).24 This act prohibits the offer or sale of securities in the U.S.
without first being registered with the SEC or being exempt from
registration.25
The ‘33 Act was obviously enacted long before the development
of cryptoassets, but the drafters of the federal securities laws certainly
foresaw the likelihood of future developments in fundraising and the
capital markets, even if particular innovations were not predictable.
The certainty that business and investment opportunities would
change over time made it important for the securities statutes to
include terms that clearly explained what a security was, while being
flexible enough to encompass interests developed in the future.
Section 2 of the ‘33 Act contains a lengthy statutory definition of
“security,” which includes terms with specific, well-understood
meanings as well as words that are more elastic and possess less
defined parameters.26 For purposes of crypto, the most important
category of “securities” is anything that qualifies as an “investment
contract.”27
The phrase “investment contract” is not defined in the statute but
rather by case law. In 1946, the U.S. Supreme Court held that “an
investment contract for purposes of the Securities Act means a
contract, transaction or scheme whereby a person invests his money
in a common enterprise and is led to expect profits solely from the
efforts of the promoter or a third party. . ..”28 Now simply known as
the Howey test, this approach has been clarified so that it is clear that
investments other than money will be sufficient,29 and minor investor
24. The ‘33 Act is codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a et seq. although many references to the
Act are to sections from the Act, rather than relying on references to the U.S. Code.
25. This requirement appears in section 5 of the ‘33 Act, codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77e.
26. 15 U.S.C. § 77b(1).
27. The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (usually ‘34 Act or Exchange Act), codified
at 15 U.S.C. § 78, includes rules applicable to brokers and exchanges and has a definition
that is similar albeit not identical to the definition that appears in the ‘33 Act. Compare 15
U.S.C. § 77b(1) with 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10). Notwithstanding the differences in wording,
the U.S. Supreme Court has indicated that the provisions should be interpreted as
meaning the same things, or in other words, in pari materia. E.g., Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389
U.S. 332, 336 (1967).
28. SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 298 (1946).
29. While the Howey test originally spoke only of “money,” subsequent opinions
have made it clear that “cash is not the only form of contribution or investment that will
create an investment contract. Instead, the ‘investment’ may take the form of ‘goods and
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participation will not prevent the last part of the test from being
satisfied.30 Thus, modern courts have rephrased the Howey test as
requiring the following elements:
there is an investment of money (or something else of value);31
in a common enterprise;32
(iii) where the purchaser expects to receive profits;33 and
(iv) the expectation of profits is from the essential
entrepreneurial efforts of others.34
Even outside the context of cryptoassets, application of the
Howey test is neither simple nor straightforward.35 After adding in the
complexities associated with the issuance and sale of cryptoassets,
services’ or ‘some other exchange of value.’” Uselton v. Commercial Lovelace Motor
Freight, Inc., 940 F.2d 564, 574 (10th Cir. 1991) (internal citations omitted).
30. Although the Court in Howey said the expectation of profits needed to be based
“solely” on the efforts of others, the rule has also been modified or clarified over time. See
S.E.C. v. Glenn W. Turner Enterprises, 474 F.2d 476, 482 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414
U.S. 821 (1973) (finding that the appropriate inquiry is “whether the efforts made by those
other than the investor are the undeniably significant ones, those essential managerial
efforts which affect the failure or success of the enterprise”). See also Hocking v. Dubois,
885 F.2d 1449, 1455 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding that the test should be whose efforts are
“significant” and “essential”).
31. See Uselton, 940 F.2d at 574.
32. Howey, 328 U.S. at 299. The requirement of a “common enterprise” is the element
of the Howey test that appears to have received the most comment over the years, in part
because there is a divergence among the federal circuits. Some courts appear to require
“horizontal commonality,” some accept “strict vertical commonality,” while others accept
“broad vertical commonality.” See Maura K. Monaghan, An Uncommon State of Confusion:
The Enterprise Element of Investment Contract Analysis, 63 FORDHAM L. REV. 2135, 2152–63
(1995) (discussing the various judicial applications of the Howey “common enterprise”
element). Horizontal commonality requires that investors’ contributions be pooled
together so their fortunes rise and fall together; strict commonality requires the investor
and promoter or investment manager to have interests that are tied together, and broad
commonality generally looks to whether the investor is depending heavily on the
promoter in deciding whether to invest. Id. See also Benjamin Akins, Jennifer L. Chapman
& Jason Gordon, The Case for the Regulation of Bitcoin Mining as a Security, 19 VA. J.L. &
TECH. 669, 690 (2015). On the other hand, while cases and academic commentators alike
have relied on these elements for decades, officials at the SEC have taken issue with the
“common enterprise” requirement, suggesting in recent documents that the SEC “does
not … view a ‘common enterprise’ as a distinct element of the term ‘investment contract.’”
Framework, supra note 6, at 12, n.10. Ironically, the text to which note 10 is appended and
the note itself specifically recognize that courts do treat the Howey test as requiring a
common enterprise as a distinct element.
33. Howey, 328 U.S. at 299. The “expectation of profits” element has also been
addressed numerous times. The U.S. Supreme Court held in United Housing Foundation,
Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837 (1975), that in order for this element to be met, “the primary
motivation for investing must be to achieve a return on the value invested.” Akins et al,
supra note 32, at 691.
34. See Glenn W. Turner Enterprises, 474 F.2d at 482; Dubois, 885 F.2d at 1455.
35. See Id.; see also Akins, supra note 32; see also Howey, 328 U.S. at 299.
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and in particular the incredible diversity of crypto and ways in which
such assets are distributed,36 it is no surprise that the SEC has found
it necessary to modify its position on cryptoassets multiple times and
that entrepreneurs express widespread concern about the lack of
clarity and certainty.37
The SEC’s first position on cryptoassets was announced in
connection with a digital venture capital fund that in some respects
resembled conventional investment business models.38 To many it
was not surprising that this set up was treated as involving the
proposed sale of securities under the Howey investment contract test.
The apparent position that this kind of crypto-business involved the
sale of securities quickly morphed into repeated statements that all
cryptoassets appeared to be investment contracts,39 and then that
position evolved to exempt Bitcoin and Ether from securities
regulation.40 The original four-part Howey analysis was then
converted into a framework with more than three dozen distinct subparts,41 and there are indications under this approach that an interest
that is a not a security at one point might later become one, or vice

36. Although Bitcoin and the first altcoins shared similar characteristics, generally
having been designed simply to substitute for fiat currencies, there are now a wide range
of interests that can function as cryptoassets. Some crypto might involve tokenized equity
or debt interests. For example, a cryptotoken might include the right to repayment of the
purchase price with interest, in lieu of more conventional bonds or debentures (depending
on whether the repayment obligation is secured). Alternatively, a cryptoasset might be
designed to function as an equity interest, conveying a right to share in an underlying
business venture’s anticipated profits or appreciation, possibly even giving voting rights
on certain matters. In these cases, requirements designed for conventional debt or equity
securities would make sense. On the other hand, crypto can have a wide range of
functions, including membership privileges, rights of access, payment rights, the ability
to stake claims to underlying assets or services, or otherwise. Treating all of these assets
as if they all work in the same way creates a host of problems.
37. Even after the more recent guidance from the SEC in April 2019, one
commentator expressly complained that the SEC “has so far failed to provide any reliable
guidance as to which criteria it uses to determine whether a token qualifies as a security.”
Diego Zuluaga, The SEC Can’t Keep Kik-ing the Crypto Can Down the Road, COINDESK (June
5, 2019, 18:45 UTC) [https://perma.cc/Y9JM-MHPQ]. The frustration evident in that
comment is repeated by those involved in crypto businesses. See, e.g., Laura Shin, Crypto
Companies and Investors Fed Up With The SEC, FORBES (May 29, 2019, 7:00 AM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/laurashin/2019/05/29/crypto-companies-andinvestors-fed-up-with-the-sec/?sh=49189da47701 (noting that crypto entrepreneurs have
“been impatient with the lack of clarity from the SEC for months, or earnestly developing
workarounds right into their technology so as to not serve U.S. customers…”).
38. See infra Part II.A.1.
39. See infra Part II.A.2.
40. See infra Part II.A.3.
41. See infra Part II.A.4.
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versa.42 Recent no-action letters point to a very limited set of
circumstances under which new cryptoassets are not likely to be
securities,43 leaving most crypto businesses in a very uncomfortable
and uncertain position. The following paragraphs trace through these
developments in somewhat cursory fashion.
i. The DAO Report (2017)
The initial position of the SEC with regard to when crypto should
be treated as a security came in 2017,44 in connection with an offering
of DAO tokens.45 The DAO was the brainchild of Slock-it, a foreign
company established by some of the founders of the Ethereum
blockchain.46 As described in the SEC’s 2017 report, The DAO “began
as an effort to create a ‘crowdfunding contract’ to raise ‘funds to grow
[a] company in the crypto space.’”47 In other words, the plan was that
The DAO would operate as a kind of venture capital fund for other
crypto projects.48 Ownership of DAO tokens entitled the holder to
vote on proposals by other crypto-based businesses. Successful
proposals would be funded by The DAO, and DAO tokenholders
would receive a share of anticipated earnings from those projects. The
DAO was set up in such a way that a group of curators was required
to screen and approve potential projects before making them
available for a vote. If approved by a curator, a proposal would be
submitted to a vote of DAO tokenholders, and any proposals

42. See infra Part II.A.5.
43. See infra Part II.A.6.
44. SEC, Report of Investigation Pursuant to Section 21(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934:
The
DAO,
‘34
Act
Release
No.
81207
(July
25,
2017),
https://www.sec.gov/litigation/investreport/34-81207.pdf
[https://perma.cc/F862YS5V] (hereinafter DAO Report).
45. Usually, “DAO” stands for decentralized autonomous organization, which is an
entity that is organized on a blockchain and operates through smart contracts. By coding
the rules by which an organization is to operate on a blockchain, the organization becomes
both decentralized and autonomous. “The DAO” project was a specific example of this
kind of entity.
46. The coding for The DAO was developed by Slock.it, a German corporation
created by some of the founders and early members of the Ethereum Community. For a
recital of the facts surrounding the creation, rise, and fall of The DAO, see Samuel Falkon,
The Story of the DAO — Its History and Consequences, Medium (Dec. 24, 2017),
https://medium.com/swlh/the-story-of-the-dao-its-history-and-consequences71e6a8a551ee [https://perma.cc/LU7M-BDM5].
47. DAO Report, supra note 44, at 4.
48. Falkon, supra note 46.
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receiving a 20% vote of the total of outstanding tokens would be
funded.49
Approximately 1.15 billion DAO tokens were issued in May 2016
in exchange for other tokens (Ether) then worth about $150 million,50
making it one of the largest early ICOs (Initial Coin Offerings) to
occur on the Ethereum platform.51 The DAO failed not because of
intervention by the SEC but as a result of an infamous hacking
incident.52 That episode eventually led to a much-publicized hard
fork of the Ethereum blockchain.
At this time, the SEC’s Division of Enforcement was
investigating whether The DAO, its founders, and various
intermediaries had violated U.S. securities laws by selling interests in
The DAO in the U.S. without registering the offering or complying
with any of the exemptions from registration. In July 2017, the SEC
released its report.53 After describing the offering, the SEC concluded
that the tokens sold by The DAO were “investment contracts” under

49. DAO Report, supra note 44.
50. Id. at 2-3.
51. The entire process is described in some detail in the DAO Report, supra note 44 at
4-8. “ICO” was the label used to describe most early public sales of cryptoassets. While
ICOs continue to occur, other kinds of distributions have been gaining in popularity. See,
i.e., Sam Stone, Binance and the Rise of the Initial Exchange Offering (IEO), Medium (Jun 12,
2019), https://medium.com/cointracker/binance-and-the-rise-of-the-initial-exchangeoffering-ieo-c45802e97fd3 [https://perma.cc/M7ER-FZPM]; Yuvai Halevi, ICO vs STO:
All You Need to Know About the New Fundraising Method in the Crypto World, HackerNoon
(Jan. 8, 2019), https://hackernoon.com/ico-vs-sto-all-you-need-to-know-about-the-newfundraising-method-in-the-crypto-world-54a1a43a08d6
[https://perma.cc/3FUYZDCZ]; and Alvin Hagg, ICO vs STO vs IEO, FreeWallet (May 21, 2019),
https://freewallet.org/blog/ico-sto-ieo.
52. The DAO also included an “out” in the event that the community invested in a
proposal that a particular investor objected to, otherwise known as the “split function.”
The split function allowed users to back out of The DAO by creating a “Child DAO,” to
which contributed Ether would be returned after 28 days. On June 17, 2016, unidentified
hackers found a loophole in this “split function,” which allowed them to drain 3.6 million
Ether (then worth about $70 million) by requesting multiple refunds of the same tokens
before The DAO could update its records. The end result was a division in the Ethereum
community.
The community at first considered a soft fork that would have blacklisted transactions
from The DAO, but this was ultimately determined not to be a viable solution. Instead,
the community split on the hard fork solution, which was designed to return the stolen
Ether. Approximately 89% of Ether holders voted for this alternative, and it occurred in
July of 2016, allowing the Ethereum Foundation to recover the stolen funds by unwinding
certain transactions. This “hard fork” (essentially a mandatory revision to the coding of
the smart contract) had “the sole function of returning all the Ether taken from The DAO
to a refund smart contract.”
53. See DAO Report, supra note 44.
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the Howey test.54 The SEC considered what it deemed to be the
elements of Howey, beginning with the requirement that there be an
investment of money.55 The absence of a cash payment was found to
be irrelevant, and instead, the SEC concluded that the payment of
other cryptoassets was a sufficient contribution of value.56 The second
articulated element was the requirement that there be “a reasonable
expectation of profits.”57 The payment of dividends or other periodic
distributions from funded projects, such as those contemplated by
The DAO, was found to meet this requirement.58 The last identified
element, whether the investors were relying on the managerial efforts
of others, received a more detailed analysis.59
In concluding that this final element was present, the SEC
focused first on the fact that “[t]he efforts of Slock.it, Slock.it’s cofounders, and The DAO’s curators were essential to the enterprise.”60
As noted by the SEC, “[t]he creators of The DAO held themselves out
to investors as experts in Ethereum, the blockchain protocol on which
The DAO operated, and told investors that they had selected persons
to serve as Curators based on their expertise and credentials.”61 The
selected curators had the power and responsibility to “(1) vet
Contractors; (2) determine whether and when to submit proposals for
votes; (3) determine the order and frequency of proposals that were
submitted for a vote; and (4) determine whether to halve the default
quorum required . . ..”62 The proper exercise of these powers was
deemed by the SEC to constitute essential managerial efforts.
In addition, the SEC articulated several ways DAO tokenholders’
voting rights were restricted,63 further supporting the agency’s
conclusion that investors had to be relying on others. First,
tokenholders could only vote on proposals that were pre-approved

54. Id. at § III.B.1, p. 11 (noting that “[a]n investment contract is an investment of
money in a common enterprise with a reasonable expectation of profits to be derived from
the entrepreneurial or managerial efforts of others.”).
55. Id. at § III.B.2, p.11.
56. Id.
57. Id. at § III.B.3, p. 11.
58. Id. at § III.B.3, p. 11-12 (finding that “The DAO was a for-profit entity whose
objective was to fund projects in exchange for a return on investment.”).
59. Id. at § III.B.4, p. 12-15.
60. Id. at § III.B.4(a), p. 12.
61. Id.
62. Id. at § III.B.4(a), p. 13.
63. Id. at § III.B.4(b), p. 13-15.
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by the curators,64 with limited information.65 Proposals were not
subject to feedback, instead being presented on a take-it or leave-it
basis.66 Tokenholders were widely dispersed, making it difficult for
them to effectuate concerted change.67 Even though online forums
allowed communication, those were pseudonymous, making them
an impractical mechanism for consolidating control.68
Given the combination of the important role of the curators and
the practical barriers to effective communication and concentration of
control by the tokenholders, the SEC concluded that The DAO’s
tokens were investment contracts. Because they had been sold
without registration or an exemption, the sales violated the ‘33 Act
prohibitions. The SEC declined to impose penalties because The DAO
had immediately cooperated with the investigation, the operation
had shut down (as a result of the hack), and funds had been returned
to purchasers.
ii. Everything is a Security (2017-18)
The 2017 DAO Report was issued amidst a spate of critical
statements made by SEC leadership in the context of ICOs, which had
been quickly gaining in popularity since the initial success of The
DAO offering in 2016. For example, in September 2017, Co-Director
of the SEC’s Enforcement Division, Steven Peikin, analogized persons
seeking quick profits from ICOs to cockroaches.69 Beginning in
December 2017, then then-Chairman of the SEC, Jay Clayton, began
repeating the mantra that most, if not all, ICOs involved the sale of

64. Id. at 14.
65. Id.
66. Id. at § III.B.4(b), p. 14.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 15.
69. Rachel-Rose O’Leary, ‘Roaches’: SEC Chief Speaks Out Against Malicious ICOs,
CoinDesk (Sept. 6, 2017), https://www.coindesk.com/roaches-sec-chief-speaksmalicious-icos [https://perma.cc/4T3L-FCW2]. Shortly before these remarks, the SEC
announced that trading in three blockchain-related companies was suspended, further
demonstrating the SEC’s concern over crypto transactions. SEC Suspends Trading in
Securities of Three Blockchain-Related Companies, Reed Smith (Aug. 29, 2017),
https://www.reedsmith.com/en/perspectives/2017/08/sec-suspends-trading-insecurities-of-three-blockchain-related-companies [https://perma.cc/M8P6-RUEZ]. See
also Michael Mendelson, From Initial Coin Offerings to Security Tokens: A U.S. Federal
Securities Law Analysis, 22 Stan. Tech. L. Rev. 52, 69–70 (2019).
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securities.70 In February 2018, in testimony before the Senate
Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, he testified that
“every ICO token the SEC has seen so far is considered a security . .
..”71 While Chairman Clayton was always careful to explain that the
SEC’s approach required a consideration of the facts and
circumstances of each transaction,72 his comments were widely
accepted as reflecting at least a rebuttable presumption that all ICOs
involved the sale of securities.73
iii. Except for Bitcoin and Ether (2018)
In the summer of 2018, the SEC’s Director of the Division of
Corporate Finance, William Hinman, refined this general approach
somewhat at the Yahoo Finance Summit.74 To the surprise of some
70. See, i.e., SEC, Jay Clayton, Statement on Cryptocurrencies and Initial Coin Offerings,
SEC (Dec. 11, 2017), https://www.sec.gov/news/public-statement/statement-clayton2017-12-11 [https://perma.cc/TY9T-MKWX] (“By and large, the structures of initial coin
offerings that I have seen promoted involve the offer and sale of securities and directly
implicate the securities registration requirements and other investor protection provisions
of our federal securities laws.”).
71. See Joseph Young, SEC Hints at Tighter Regulation for ICOs, Smart Policies for “True
Cryptocurrencies,” CoinTelegraph (Feb. 9, 2018), https://cointelegraph.com/news/sechints-at-tighter-regulation-for-icos-smart-policies-for-true-cryptocurrencies
[https://perma.cc/Z5KF-BXG9].
72. For example, in an explanation to the U.S. Senate Committee on Banking,
Housing, and Urban Affairs, Chairman Clayton emphasized that “determining what falls
within the ambit of a securities offer and sale is a facts-and-circumstances analysis,
utilizing a principles-based framework that has served American companies and
American investors well through periods of innovation and change for over 80 years.”
SEC, Jay Clayton, Statement on Cryptocurrencies and Initial Coin Offerings, SEC (Dec. 11,
2017),
https://www.sec.gov/news/public-statement/statement-clayton-2017-12-11
[https://perma.cc/TY9T-MKWX] (“By and large, the structures of initial coin offerings
that I have seen promoted involve the offer and sale of securities and directly implicate
the securities registration requirements and other investor protection provisions of our
federal securities laws.”).
73. See, e.g., Daniel C. Zinman, et al., SEC Issues Warning to Lawyers on ICOs,
Bloomberg Law (Feb. 22, 2018), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/tech-and-telecomlaw/sec-issues-warning-to-lawyers-on-icos [https://perma.cc/FBB5-AWF9]. This source
examines a number of recent pronouncements and actions taken by the SEC and
concludes that “the SEC has essentially adopted a rebuttable presumption that ICO tokens
are securities that must comply with the registration requirements of the securities laws.”
Evelyn Cheng, The SEC Just Made it Clearer That Securities Laws Apply to Most
Cryptocurrencies and Exchanges Trading Them, CNBC (Mar. 7, 2018, 5:14 PM),
https://www.cnbc.com/2018/03/07/the-sec-made-it-clearer-that-securities-lawsapply-to-cryptocurrencies.html [https://perma.cc/J7CY-CEZH].
74. See SEC, William Hinman, Digital Asset Transactions: When Howey Met Gary
(Plastic), SEC (June 14, 2018), https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/speech-hinman061418 [https://perma.cc/H3YU-DX3K].
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and the relief of others, Director Hinman acknowledged that not all
cryptoassets are securities, specifically pointing to Bitcoin and Ether
as examples of tokens that should not be viewed as securities. In the
case of those two assets, Hinman suggested that the underlying
network was “sufficiently decentralized,” so that “purchasers would
no longer reasonably expect a person or group to carry out essential
managerial or entrepreneurial efforts. . ..”75 He concluded that
“[a]pplying the disclosure regime of the federal securities laws to the
offer and resale of Bitcoin would seem to add little value.”76
In his April 2018 testimony before the House Appropriations
Committee, Chairman Clayton appeared to acquiesce in the view that
Bitcoin, at least, would not be a security. He explained that “there are
different types of cryptoassets. . .. A pure medium of exchange, the
one that’s most often cited, is Bitcoin. As a replacement for currency,
that has been determined by most people to not be a security.”77 This
is a relatively odd rationale to adopt, since, in fact, Bitcoin generally
does not function well as a medium of exchange, given the high
volatility of its pricing and the relatively small number of users who
accept this asset as payment in lieu of fiat currency.78 Nonetheless, the
remarks appeared to confirm the SEC’s position that older, wellestablished, decentralized cryptoassets might not all be securities.
iv. Supplementing Howey with a “Framework”
A more recent development from the SEC regarding the
appropriate treatment of cryptoassets is also its most comprehensive.
On April 3, 2019, FinHub (an SEC portal designed to specifically
engage with companies using blockchain and other innovative
technologies)79 released a detailed “Framework” explaining how the

75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Neeraj Agrawal, SEC Chairman Clayton: Bitcoin is not a security, COINCENTER (Ap.
27, 2018), https://www.coincenter.org/sec-chairman-clayton-bitcoin-is-not-a-security/
[https://perma.cc/S8MF-7AKH].
78. In fact, one commentator has posited eight distinct reasons why Bitcoin fails as a
currency. Alex Dumortier, 8 Reasons Bitcoin Fails as a Currency, THE MOTLEY FOOL (Ap. 18,
2019),
https://www.fool.com/slideshow/8-reasons-bitcoin-fails-currency/
[https://perma.cc/QU3E-3D8P]. The listed reasons include at the very outset the reality
that Bitcoin “has virtually zero acceptance as a means of payment.” Id.
79. See Michael del Castillo, SEC Launches Fintech Hub To Engage With Cryptocurrency
Startups
And
More,
FORBES
(Oct.
18,
2018),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/michaeldelcastillo/2018/10/18/sec-launches-fintech-
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SEC now plans to apply the Howey test to cryptoassets.80 The
Framework refers to crypto as “digital assets,” and sets out a lengthy
multi-factored approach to determine whether a particular form of
crypto is a security.
In the Framework, the SEC suggests that the first two elements
of Howey (an investment of money or something of value,81 and a
common enterprise82) are generally present in crypto sales.83 Most of
the document’s discussion therefore focuses on whether a purchaser
of a given cryptoasset has the reasonable expectation of profits
derived from the efforts of others.84
In analyzing the third element, the Framework sets out dozens
of considerations, some with multiple subparts.85 While various
characteristics are described as “especially relevant,”86 the
Framework also notes that no single characteristic is “necessarily”
determinative.87 Perhaps even more confusingly, the Framework
suggests that interests may have to be reevaluated after the initial sale
to determine whether an interest that was not originally a security
might have become one.88 With regard to whether there is a
reasonable expectation of profits, the Framework lists several
characteristics and suggests that the more that are present, the more
likely the interest is to be a security.89 The Framework does not,
hub-to-engage-with-cryptocurrency-startups-and-more/?sh=3c9e55135978
[https://perma.cc/2DJK-7RG2].
80. Framework, supra note 6. The accuracy of this assertion, especially in the context
of transactions such as airdrops, is not universally accepted. See infra note 144. For a brief
explanation of the framework, see SEC, Bill Hinman & Valerie Szczepanik, Statement on
“Framework for ‘Investment Contract’ Analysis of Digital Assets” (Ap. 3, 2019),
https://www.sec.gov/news/public-statement/statement-framework-investmentcontract-analysis-digital-assets [https://perma.cc/5CVA-RYFB] (hereinafter referred to
as “Statement.”).
81. “The first prong of the Howey test is typically satisfied in an offer and sale of a
digital asset because the digital asset is purchased or otherwise acquired in exchange for
value, whether in the form of real (or fiat) currency, another digital asset, or other type of
consideration” Framework, supra note 6 at § II.A, p. 2.
82. “Based on our experiences to date, investments in digital assets have constituted
investments in a common enterprise because the fortunes of digital asset purchasers have
been linked to each other or to the success of the promoter’s efforts. See S.E.C. v. Int’l Loan
Network, Inc., 968 F.2d 1304, 1307 (D.C. Cir. 1992).” Framework, supra note 6, at 2, n.11.
83. Id. at 2.
84. Framework, supra note 6, at 2-11.
85. Id.
86. Id. at § II.C.1, p. 3.
87. Id.
88. Id. a 5.
89. Id. at § II.C.2, p. 6.
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however, give any indication of how many of the described
characteristics will be necessary or sufficient and does not indicate if
any of the specified items will be weighted more heavily than the
others.
v. Now it is; Now it isn’t
As previously mentioned, the Framework takes what appears to
be the highly unusual position that a particular asset might be a
security at one point, and then become something other than a
security at a later point, or vice versa. In other contexts, the rule that
“once a security, always a security” has been widely applied.90 A
classification scheme that changes over time poses significant
problems for crypto businesses, since even if a particular form of
crypto is not an investment contract at the time of the initial sale or
issuance, later events outside the control of the developer, issuer, or
initial seller might somehow convert the interest into a security, with
an unpredictable impact on earlier transactions.91 For example,
suppose a crypto developer makes a token sale to persons that the
developer has every reason to believe are purchasing for use rather
90. This is not actually a phrase typically used in connection with the investment
contract analysis, although in practice it has generally taken a change in the nature of the
interest being conveyed to turn something into a security when it previously lacked that
characteristic. Consistent with this view, in Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U.S. 551 (1982), the
U.S. Supreme Court rejected the argument that a certificate of deposit could change
character “into a security when pledged, even though it was not a security when
purchased.” Id. at 559, n.9. Similarly, in Gould v. Ruefenacht, 471 U.S. 701(1985), the Court
rejected the argument that corporate stock should cease being a security if the purchaser
acquired control of the corporation. The Court disagreed, concluding that this “would
lead to arbitrary distinctions between transactions covered [by securities laws] and those
that are not.” Id. at 702.
91. This is not at all the same thing as subsequent events that impact the availability
of exemptions for particular sales. It is absolutely true, for example, that resales before a
security come to rest may be integrated with initial sales, sometimes destroying the
availability of exemptions. THOMAS LEE HAZEN & KRIS MARKARIAN, FEDERAL SECURITIES
LAW (2011), § D. Exemptions from Registration Under 1933 Act, 2003 WL 23841279. This
treatise explains that “[t]ransaction exemptions rise and fall with both the form and
substance of the transaction and the nature of the participants. These exemptions, once
available, can be destroyed when purchasers under the exemption resell the securities.
Downstream sales have the potential to eradicate an existing exemption.” Intrastate and
private offerings could be impacted in this way, which is why issuers are generally well
advised to place limitations on resales. Id. In all of these cases, however, the interest is a
security; it is only the availability of the exemption that is in question. The general
applicability of the securities laws does not change. This is a very different scenario than
the situation when the same interest may on day one be something other than a security,
and on day two suddenly become one even if the interest itself has not changed.
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than as a speculative investment. Suppose also that some of those
tokens are resold to persons clearly hoping to make a profit on their
investment. The presence of investors at a later date could
conceivably convert something that was not a security into a security
long after the initial sale. Alternatively, if the developer conducts an
airdrop where the recipients make no contribution at all and therefore
have no expectation of profits or anything else, it might be expected
that this is not the sale of investment contracts. However, if the crypto
is later sold to third parties, you could easily find investors who do
expect profits, which could theoretically convert everything into
securities. On the other hand, an asset that is sold as a security might
later become something other than a security if it becomes so widely
held that only market forces are expected to control pricing.
The fact that a security might at some future point cease to be a
security may not present any significant risks to entrepreneurs or
others.92 Unfortunately, a test that does not yield consistent results
could be highly problematic and unpredictable when something that
is not a security at the time of sale later becomes subject to the
requirements of the federal securities laws.
vi. No Action Letters
Alongside the Framework, the SEC released its first no-action
letter opining that a newly created cryptoasset would not be a
security under the terms described in the request.93 Unfortunately,
factors that the SEC mentions as being important to its decision in the
TurnKey Jet case also reveal that the no-action letter is unlikely to be
relevant to most cryptoassets.94 First, the applicant made it clear that
the token-generated funds could not be used to develop the
underlying technology, which was already functional. 95 The tokens
were to be sold at a fixed price of one dollar, and could be used only
92. For example, the SEC has hinted that the widespread distribution of both Bitcoin
and Ether have allowed them to become so “decentralized” that they can no longer be
considered securities. See supra Part II.A.3. Presumably, when these cryptoassets were
originally issued, the distribution would have been narrower, meaning that the securities
laws could have applied to the asset, which has not significantly changed its nature in the
intervening period of time.
93. TurnKey Jet, Inc., Response of the Division of Corporation Finance (Apr. 3, 2019),
https://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/cf-noaction/2019/turnkey-jet-040219-2a1.htm
[https://perma.cc/E399-FSR3] (hereinafter “TurnKey Jet”).
94. Id.
95. Id.
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to obtain air charter services. 96 Repurchases would only be made at a
discount, and there was to be no representation that there would be
any profit potential because the tokens were not transferable.97 It is
the non-transferability, in particular, that radically limits the general
usefulness of this particular no-action letter.
A second no-action letter involving a cryptoasset was issued by
the SEC a few months later.98 Pocketful of Quarters, referred to as
“PoQ” in the letter, asked for the SEC to opine on its ERC-20
“Quarters,” a token that represents a small amount ($0.0025 in Ether)
that would be locked up on a smart contract functioning in the
context of online gaming platforms.99 As was the case in the earlier
TurnKey no-action letter,100 the PoQ Quarters were already
functional, and funds raised from the sales of the tokens would not
be used to fund development of the programming.101 In addition, the
Quarters were not designed to be resold or transferrable outside of
the PoQ closed platform and could not be traded between players.102
Given these factors, PoQ represented, and the SEC relied on the
argument, that price appreciation would be “highly unlikely, if not
practically impossible.”103
As with the TurnKey tokens,104 the proposed PoQ Quarters
appear to be substantially different from typical cryptoassets. On the
other hand, at least some commentators regarded this second noaction letter as a progressive development since Quarters are
potentially transferable to third-parties, albeit only on the closed PoQ
platform.105
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Pocketful of Quarters, Inc., (July 25, 2019), Response of the Division of Corporation
Finance
https://www.sec.gov/corpfin/pocketful-quarters-inc-072519-2a1
[https://perma.cc/6GTP-7Z7C] (hereinafter “PoQ”).
99. For a thoughtful explanation of the PoQ request and the SEC response, see
Mitchell Moos, SEC issues no-action letter for Ethereum token “Quarters,” what it means for
crypto, CryptoSlate (July 26, 2019), https://cryptoslate.com/sec-issues-no-action-letterethereum-quarters-crypto/ [https://perma.cc/52JC-HLWJ].
100. TurnKey Jet, supra note 93.
101. PoQ, supra note 98.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. See supra notes 93-97 and accompanying text.
105. Among the commentators who have applauded the PoQ no-action letter as a step
in the right direction are Caitlan Long, a well-known and respected blockchain lawyer
who co-founded the influential Wyoming Blockchain Coalition and Marco Santori, an
influential fintech attorney formerly with Cooley LLP who helped develop the original
Protocol Labs SAFT white paper. See Moos, supra note 99.
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vii. Confusion and Uncertainty
The FinHub Framework was clearly intended to be helpful to
members of the crypto community, including developers, issuers,
and their counsel. However, the overall utility of a framework that is
not an official rule or pronouncement, includes 38 different
considerations (some with additional subparts), and neither
prioritizes nor indicates the degree of significance for any such
consideration, is questionable at best.
Shortly after the Framework and TurnKey no-action letters were
released, SEC Commissioner Hester Peirce gave a speech addressing
her concerns about the approach suggested by the new document.106
Her assessment of the Framework was less than glowing, noting that
the document could “raise more questions and concerns than it
answers.”107 As she observed:
While Howey has four factors to consider, the framework lists 38
separate considerations, many of which include several sub-points. A
seasoned securities lawyer might be able to infer which of these
considerations will likely be controlling and might therefore be able
to provide the appropriate weight to each. . . . [N]on-lawyers and
lawyers not steeped in securities law and its attendant lore will not
know what to make of the guidance. Pages worth of factors, many of
which seemingly apply to all decentralized networks, might
contribute to the feeling that navigating the securities laws in this area
is perilous business.108

The SAFT project was an attempt to create relatively simple documentation for a two-step
fund-raising process through which businesses would first sell contractual rights to
tokens to be delivered when developed, followed by a second broader public distribution
of the functional tokens. The intent was to create a process whereby companies could
comply with one or more exemptions for the first stage of the fundraising process, which
was anticipated to involve the sale of a security, followed by a wider sale of utility tokens
that would not be securities and therefore would fall outside the scope of the federal
securities laws. For a fuller discussion of the SAFT process see the whitepaper: Juan BatizBenet, Jesse Clayburgh, & Marco Santori, The SAFT Project: Toward a Compliant Token Sale
Framework (Oct. 2, 2017), https://www.cooley.com/~/media/cooley/pdf/reprints/saftproject-whitepaper.ashx [https://perma.cc/XDP4-MQU5].
106. See Peirce Speech, supra note 18.
107. Id.
108. Id.
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However, on July 8, 2019, the SEC, in a Joint Statement along
with FINRA,109 reiterated its commitment to the positions taken in the
Framework. This Joint Statement did, however, more definitively
articulate the position that some cryptoassets would not be securities.
In explaining the decision to utilize the phrase “digital asset security”
in that statement, the SEC and FINRA explained that in their view,
digital assets, defined to include (without limitation) virtual
currencies, coins, and tokens, “may or may not meet the definition of
a ‘security’ under the federal securities laws.”110 The precise
parameters of when such interests would be regulated as securities
were not laid out in the statement.

B. KIK AND TELEGRAM
The reality is that the “correct” application of the Howey
investment contract test to cryptoassets has yet to be determined. This
might not be surprising given that most entrepreneurs in the crypto
space lack the resources to go head-to-head with the SEC in
protracted litigation. It appeared this might change in the summer
and fall of 2019 with not one but two major cases being initiated.
On June 6, 2019, the SEC filed a lengthy complaint in the
Southern District of New York, alleging that a Canadian social media
company, Kik Interactive Inc., had violated the federal securities law
by selling a trillion unregistered tokens which it called “Kin.”111 Kik
promptly launched a crowdfunding initiative to help oppose the
SEC’s attempted enforcement action, creating a defense fund of more
than $5 million.112 A significant basis of its defense is that the Kin
tokens it sold were not investment contracts.113 Kik also asserted that
109. Digital Asset Securities, supra note 6. It should, however, be noted that this
statement is not a rule, regulation, guidance, or official pronouncement of the SEC and
has no legal force or effect. Id. at n. 2.
110. Id. at n.1.
111. See
S.E.C.
v.
Kik
Interactive
Inc.,
Complaint,
https://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2019/comp-pr2019-87.pdf
[https://perma.cc/R8KU-CJD3].
112. Kik’s crowdfunding initiative, called “Defend Crypto,” collected approximately
$1.9 million by the end of June 2019, in addition to the $5 million paid in by Kik itself.
Nikhilesh De, Blockchain Association Takes Over Kik’s ‘Defend Crypto’ Crowdfunding Effort,
YAHOO! FINANCE (June 28, 2019), https://finance.yahoo.com/news/blockchainassociation-takes-over-kik-130040612.html [ https://perma.cc/LM8W-2SB4].
113. The Kik answer has been described as “fairly combative.” BitBlog Weekly
Summary: Kik Kicks Back and the SEC continues its enforcement campaign against ICOs, THE
NAT’L L. REV. (Aug. 19, 2019), https://www.natlawreview.com/article/bitblog-weekly-
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the SEC’s approach to defining when cryptoassets were investment
contracts is unconstitutionally vague.114
Parallel to the Kik litigation, the SEC also initiated an
enforcement action against Telegram Group Inc. and Ton Issuer Inc.
(jointly referred to as Telegram in the complaint and in this Article)
alleging that they violated the federal securities laws by conducting
an unregistered digital token offering in the U.S. and overseas.115
Telegram had already raised $1.7 billion from accredited investors
who had purchased contractual rights (SAFTs)116 that were designed
to allow them to acquire digital tokens to be known as Grams when
those assets were released. Before the Grams could be issued, the SEC
filed an emergency action and obtained a TRO to prevent Telegram
from “flooding the U.S. markets with digital tokens that we allege
were unlawfully sold.”117
Both Kik and Telegram had significant assets at their disposal to
fight the SEC and considerable financial incentives to oppose the SEC
approach. The Telegram suit moved faster, and on February 19, 2020,
the SEC and Telegram presented arguments on the “economic
realities” of the tokens that were to be issued, presenting their
positions on the issue of whether the securities laws had been
violated.

summary-kik-kicks-back-and-sec-continues-its-enforcement-campaign
[https://perma.cc/3ZAY-QSRL]. A copy of Kik’s answer can be found online at
https://www.scribd.com/document/420998937/Kik-Response-toSEC#from_embed?campaign=SkimbitLtd&ad_group=100652X1574425X2ec01739337c37
5e5407e33ba209d751&keyword=660149026&source=hp_affiliate&medium=affiliate
114. Id.
115. S.E.C. v. Telegram Group, Inc., No. 19 Civ. 9439 (PKC) (S.D.N.Y. filed Oct. 11,
2019).
A
copy
of
the
SEC’s
complaint
is
available
online
at
https://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2019/comp-pr2019-212.pdf.
116. A SAFT, or Simple Agreement for Future Tokens, is a process that was designed
to allow crypto entrepreneurs to raise funds in anticipation of the development of a
functional “utility token.” The goal of the project was to facilitate compliant token sales
through the sale of contractual rights that would be securities and would require
registration or an exemption, followed by a later distribution of a functional token that
would not qualify as an investment contract. For a fuller discussion of the SAFT process
see the whitepaper: Juan Batiz-Benet, Jesse Clayburgh, & Marco Santori, The SAFT Project:
Toward
a
Compliant
Token
Sale
Framework
(Oct.
2,
2017),
https://www.cooley.com/~/media/cooley/pdf/reprints/saft-project-whitepaper.ashx
[https://perma.cc/XDP4-MQU5]. Both the Kik and Telegram sales were conducted
through SAFTs or SAFT-like processes.
117. SEC, Press Release, SEC Halts Alleged $1.7 Billion Unregistered Digital Token
Offering
(Oct.
11,
2019),
https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2019-212
[https://perma.cc/759K-97DH].
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On March 24, 2020, the court granted the SEC’s request for a
preliminary injunction, halting the proposed sale of Grams on the
grounds that the SEC had “shown a substantial likelihood of success
in proving that the contracts and understandings . . . would be an
integral part of the sale of securities without a required registration
statement.”118 Telegram sought to limit the scope of the order to U.S.
purchasers, but on April 1, 2020, Judge Castel refused to limit his
ruling on the basis that there was a substantial risk of resales to U.S.
citizens.119 Telegram abandoned its proposed crypto-offering in the
wake of this decision,120 discontinuing an appeal to the Second Circuit
and agreeing to return $1.2 billion to investors worldwide and to pay
a fine of $18.5 million to the SEC.121
On September 30, 2020, the court ruled in favor of the SEC on its
motion for summary judgment, concluding that the “two phases” of
the Kik offering were intertwined so that the sale of contractual rights
and the eventual public offering of Kin tokens were part of a single
plan of financing with a single purpose amounting to “an
unregistered offering of securities that did not qualify for
exemption.”122 The judge relied on an extensive analysis of the Howey
investment contract test in determining that the Kik had conducted
an illegal sale of securities.123
The ultimate impact of these two decisions, both of which came
out of the Southern District of New York, is uncertain. There is no
way of knowing if other courts will agree with the analysis employed
in those cases, and that uncertainty is likely to continue until and

118. S.E.C. v. Telegram Group, Inc., No. 19 Civ. 9439 (PKC) at 2 (S.D.N.Y., order of
March
24,
2020),
https://s3.cointelegraph.com/storage/uploads/view/c527a1e90d0e61f7470ee7ffca156e
03.pdf?_ga=2.187482024.1278622065.1585599576-2031387624.1582929207
[https://perma.cc/4WWK-LKBX].
119. See S.E.C. v. Telegram Group Inc, No. 1:2019cv09439 - Document 234 (S.D.N.Y.
2020),
https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/district-courts/newyork/nysdce/1:2019cv09439/524448/234/ [https://perma.cc/G585-TSFC].
120. See Kevin Helms, Telegram Drops TON Cryptocurrency Project After US Prohibits
Global Distribution, Bitcoin.com (May 13, 2020), https://news.bitcoin.com/telegram-toncryptocurrency/ [https://perma.cc/9K2N-VWTU].
121. SEC Press release, Telegram to Return $1.2 Billion to Investors and Pay $18.5 Million
Penalty
to
Settle
SEC
Charges,
Rel.
2020-146
(June
26,
2020)
(https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2020-146).
122. SEC v. Kik Interactive Inc., No. 19 Civ. 5244 (AKH) (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2020)
(Opinion
and
Order
on
Motions
for
Summary
Judgment)
at
17,
https://www.courtlistener.com/docket/15722539/88/us-securities-and-exchangecommission-v-kik-interactive-inc/ [https://perma.cc/43WJ-K7JA].
123. Id. at 8-14.
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unless the Supreme Court issues a definitive ruling on the subject.
Until then, considerable resources are being devoted to the
preliminary question of whether and when crypto is within the
regulatory authority of the SEC, a problem for entrepreneurs and
regulators alike. Not only is the lack of clarity inefficient, it stifles
innovation with no clear offsetting benefits. And, in the final analysis,
even if crypto is eventually found to be a security by the courts in
most cases, the underlying regulatory framework is still out of step
with the needs of potential entrepreneurs and investors alike.

C. TO WHOM DO THE REQUIREMENTS APPLY?
Assuming that the position of the SEC is correct, and that most
offerings of crypto do involve the sale of securities, the federal
securities laws make it illegal to offer or sell the cryptoasset unless it
is first registered or exempt from registration.124 The registration
process is incredibly expensive and time consuming125 and requires
voluminous disclosures. Much of the required information seems to
have little direct relevance to the primary interests of crypto investors
and some of required data is simply outside the knowledge or control
of the issuer.126 Many potential exemptions are also expensive and
require similar disclosures.127 They are also often complex enough to
require the assistance of experienced securities counsel.128
124. This is the clear import of section 5 of the ‘33 Act. 15 U.S.C. § 77e.
125. The first time a business sells its securities publicly, it is said to be conducting an
initial public offering, or IPO. The registration expenses incurred in an IPO are costly. One
survey conducted by Oxford Economics reported that 83% of CFOs estimated spending
more than $1 million on one-time costs associated with the IPO, not including
underwriting fees. Results reported in PWC, Considering an IPO to Fuel your Company’s
Future?, https://www.pwc.com/us/en/deals/publications/assets/cost-of-an-ipo.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8P62-Q97X].
(A
summary
is
archived
at
https://www.pwc.com/us/en/services/deals/library/cost-of-an-ipo.html
[https://perma.cc/459M-57PS). PWC suggests that the average total cost of an IPO (with
underwriting, legal and accounting fees included) is approximately $4.2 million. In
addition to the expense, the time required is also significant. An IPO takes between 90
days to 6 months to complete (from the company’s decision to go public up through the
SEC’s declaration that the registration is “effective”), depending on the complexity of the
underlying transactions necessary to get the company in shape for the sale. Id. at 2.
126. For a consideration of how the kinds of disclosures required in a registration
mesh with the probable needs of most crypto purchasers, see Cybersecurity, supra note 4,
at Part III.A.
127. Id., at Parts III.B & C.
128. Even attorneys are often cautioned about the complexities of the law in this arena.
Raising capital is often a necessary step for any business seeking to grow. Although an
ordinary, seemingly straightforward business decision, capital raising operates within a
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The ‘33 Act prohibits all public sales of securities unless there is
an available exemption, regardless of who created the security or
whether the transaction involves an initial sale or a resale.129
Fortunately, there is a general exemption for anyone other than the
issuer, underwriter, or any securities dealer,130 but in the context of
cryptoassets, the “issuer” of the securities may not be clear, and the
question of who counts as an underwriter or dealer may be equally
complicated.
These are defined terms, but the statutory provisions were not
written with cryptoassets in mind. For example, the term “issuer” is
defined in the ‘33 Act as “every person who issues or proposes to
issue any securities” with certain exception for certificates of deposit;
voting-trust certificates; unincorporated investment trusts;
unincorporated associations, trusts, or entities providing limited
liability to members; and undivided fractional interests in mineral
rights.131 To say that an issuer is someone who issues something is
completely circular, especially when “issue” is never defined.
Perhaps in the context of conventional securities there was no
need for greater clarity because the legal person creating the equity
or debt interest is generally readily identifiable. That is not
necessarily the case for cryptoassets.
In one sense, the “issuer” of crypto is the computer program,
which operates to create the unique string of numbers that constitutes
the totality of a cryptoasset’s physical existence. Unfortunately, as
mentioned above, “issuer” is defined in the federal securities laws to
include “persons” which means legally recognized individuals,

heavily regulated arena—at both the state and federal levels. The substantial regulation
stems from the fact that when outside funding is sought for a business operation, it often,
if not usually, involves the sale of a “security.” This is critical, as the sale of a security
requires SEC compliance, and failure to comply can result in potentially severe
consequences. For this reason it is imperative that attorneys practicing in this area be
familiar with the definition of a security and how to identify when a security is present in
order to avoid the consequences of selling a security in violation of the securities laws.
Zachary Bruchmiller, Navigating the Private Offering Exemptions: A Guide for Practitioners,
46 No. 1 SEC. REG. L.J. (Spr. 2018) (fn omitted).
129. 15 U.S.C. § 77e.
130. Section 4(a)(1) of the ‘33 Act exempts transactions by “any person other than an
issuer, underwriter, or dealer.” 15 U.S.C. § 77d(a).
131. 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(4). The ‘34 Act similarly defines “issuer” to mean “any person
who issues or proposes to issue any security,” with a shorter list of exceptions. 15 U.S.C.
§ 78c(8). Neither the ‘33 nor ‘34 Act defines what it actually means to “issue” a security.
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associations, and entities.132 To date, computer programs are not
generally recognized as legal persons.133
If you disregard the computer program, that leaves the persons
who wrote the protocol, those who control its refinement, those who
promote it, those who install it on their computers and act as nodes,
and those who mine the asset (assuming the asset is one of the
minable forms of crypto). That is an incredibly wide and diverse
group of persons who are unlikely to be acting in concert on most
“decisions.” The consensus protocol that replaces management
decisions in a conventional business enterprise is so distributed for
many cryptoassets that identifying “the” issuer responsible for
disclosures may often be impossible.
Consider what this means for a cryptoasset such as Bitcoin. The
person or persons who used the pseudonym “Satoshi Nakamoto”
wrote about the potential to create blockchains for digital assets using
new consensus protocols in 2008 and launched the Bitcoin protocol
with open-source software in 2009.134 Thereafter, he, she, or they
allowed the program to operate with new Bitcoins being “created”
and credited to Bitcoin miners in accordance with the terms of the
underlying software. Who is “issuing” those cryptoassets? No one
has definitively identified the “real” Satoshi Nakamoto, and the
132. In both the ‘33 and ‘34 Acts, “person” is also specifically defined. In the ‘33 Act,
the definition is “an individual, a corporation, a partnership, an association, a joint-stock
company, a trust, any unincorporated organization, or a government or political
subdivision thereof,” with further limitations on the when a “trust” is within the scope of
the Act. 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(2). “Person” is defined in the ‘34 Act as “a natural person,
company, government, or political subdivision, agency, or instrumentality of a
government.” 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(9). Note that neither definition of “person” references
anything like a computer program or artificial intelligence.
133. Restatement (Third) of Agency § 1.04 (Am. Law. Inst. 2006) (“Likewise, a
computer program is not capable of acting as a principal or an agent as defined by the
common law. At present, computer programs are instrumentalities of the persons who
use them.”). A decade earlier, two commentators offered three reasons for conferring legal
personhood on autonomous computer programs, including moral expediency (which
even the authors acknowledged to be controversial), social reality given that the law
already recognizes other artificial legal persons, and legal expediency. See Tom Allen &
Robin Widdison, Can Computers Make Contracts?, 9 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 25, 35-43 (1996).
However, it is generally accepted that, as of yet, the law has declined to extend the rights
and responsibilities of legal personhood on computer programs. See Bert-Jaap Koops et.
al, Bridging the Accountability Gap: Rights for New Entities in the Information Society?, 11
MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 497, 512 (2010) (“[S]o far, only natural persons, specific types of
companies, associations, a trust fund, and public bodies have been attributed legal
personhood.”).
134. Satoshi Yakamoto, Bitcoin—A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System,
[https://bitcoin.org/bitcoin.pdf.2008]. This “whitepaper” originally appeared in an
online discussion of cryptography.
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wallets used by that person or persons have been untapped for some
time. We do not even know if Satoshi is still alive. But if the issuer is
not Satoshi, who is it? If the computer program itself cannot be the
issuer because it is not a legal person, then this question is difficult to
answer.
In the context of most, but not all, cryptoassets, it is possible to
identify the programmers, and often the legal person who has
commissioned the development of the program. Sometimes the
“token” is actually pre-functional and is being developed on behalf
of an entity or association of persons as a work for hire, in which case
the issuer may be easy to identify (as in the case of traditional
securities). In some instances, however, the programmers may be
working alone, and their actual identities may not be known.135 In
addition, even if authorities can identify who wrote the code, that
does not necessarily mean those persons are responsible for “issuing”
the resulting digital assets.
Further complicating matters is the definition of “underwriter”
which as used in the ‘33 Act means:
[A]ny person who has purchased from an issuer with a view to,
or offers or sells for an issuer in connection with, the distribution of
any security, or participates or has a direct or indirect participation in
any such undertaking, or participates or has a participation in the
direct or indirect underwriting of any such undertaking; but such
135. Obviously, the programmers know who they are, but this information is not
necessarily shared with others. For example, in addition to Bitcoin (where no
programmer’s identity is known), five of the seven developers for Monero have kept their
identities secret. The Complete Guide to Monero Cryptocurrency, BITDEGREE (Dec. 31, 2019),
[https://perma.cc/P2A9-KRYZ].In other cases, there are conflicting reports about who
created the programming needed to develop particular cryptoassets. Cardano claims that
it was developed by a “global team of leading academics and engineers.” What is Cardano?
CARDANO (Jan. 17, 2020, 9:02 AM), [https://perma.cc/6UA5-T27K]. What is Cardano?
CARDANO ROADMAP (Jan. 17, 2020, 9:09 AM), [https://perma.cc/M4UH-LAAH]
(“Cardano is designed by a global team of experts who are leaders in disciplines ranging
from distributed systems to programming languages and game theory and is jointly
developed by IOHK and partners.”). Other sources credit Charles Hoskinson with being
the “creator” of Cardano. See Marie Huillet, If Bitcoin fails, Crypto Industry in for a Bad Time:
Cardano Founder, COINTELEGRAPH (Oct. 11, 2019), [https://perma.cc/EZS7-Z3XQ]. This
kind of information makes it hard to pinpoint who actually developed the cryptoasset in
question. Even where there is agreement on the identity of the development team, if the
group is too dispersed or amorphous, identification of who has sufficient responsibility to
make them a promoter of the asset may be challenging. For example, NEO is a
decentralized, open-source cryptocurrency launched in China. See NEO Cryptocurrency:
Everything You Need to Know about China Ethereum, CoinSutra (Aug. 12, 2019),
[https://perma.cc/DU8M-FPC9]. Da Hongfei and Erik Zhang are identified as cofounders of the platform and “co-developers,” along with “other community developers”
and contributors. Id.
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term shall not include a person whose interest is limited to a
commission from an underwriter or dealer not in excess of the usual
and customary distributors’ or sellers’ commission. As used in this
paragraph the term “issuer” shall include, in addition to an issuer,
any person directly or indirectly controlling or controlled by the
issuer, or any person under direct or indirect common control with
the issuer.136
To determine who is considered an underwriter, it is first
necessary to identify the issuer, since an underwriter includes anyone
who “purchased” from the issuer or is acting for the issuer in
connection with a distribution of securities as well as anyone
participating in those efforts. Without knowing who counts as the
issuer, it is virtually impossible to know who counts as an
underwriter. In addition, there are some kinds of transactions that
may or may not lead to someone being a potential underwriter. For
example, can you classify the recipient of an airdrop or a crypto miner
as a purchaser who has acquired the cryptoasset with a view to
distributing it?137 These are not simple questions to answer.
In addition, dealers are also ineligible for the usual exemption
for resales.138 A “dealer” under the ‘33 Act is “any person who
engages either for all or part of his time, directly or indirectly, as
agent, broker, or principal, in the business of offering, buying, selling,
or otherwise dealing or trading in securities issued by another
person.”139 To apply this definition, it may again be necessary to know
what other “person” “issued” the securities, although it is also

136. 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(11).
137. An airdrop is “the process whereby a cryptocurrency enterprise distributes
cryptocurrency tokens to the wallets of some users free of charge. Airdrops are usually
carried out by blockchain-based startups to bootstrap their cryptocurrency projects.” What
are “Airdrops” in Crypto World? MEDIUM (Feb 15, 2018), [https://perma.cc/DCN8-TB8E].
For a further description of airdrops, see Carol Goforth, It’s Raining Crypto: The Need for
Regulatory Clarification When it Comes to Airdrops, 15 INDIAN J. OF LAW AND TECH 322, 32326 (2019). It should be fairly obvious why these transactions may be distinguishable from
“purchases,” which generally required payment of something as consideration.
“Mining” also differs from conventional purchase transactions. Instead of “paying” the
seller to obtain something of value, a miner participates in the process of validating and
verifying transactions in order to add them to the blockchain’s public ledger. Successful
mining typically requires being the first to solve a computationally difficult mathematical
problem, which is incentivized by the reward of new cryptoassets. For a more detailed
description of the process and what it entails, see Jason Evanelho, Mining 101: An
Introduction To Cryptocurrency Mining, FORBES (Mar. 13, 2018), [https://perma.cc/ZPE7VFBX].
138. See 15 U.S.C. § 77d(a)(1), see generally note 137.
139. 5 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(12).
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possible that the SEC or the courts could simply say that the dealer is
someone who did not issue the securities, meaning some other person
had to have issued it. Thus, if an individual is “in the business” of
trading in crypto, they could be a dealer. Since the usual function of
many forms of crypto is to trade to make a profit (since it is relatively
difficult to use most crypto to pay for goods or services),140 this could
theoretically mean that almost all crypto purchasers are “dealers,”
even if they trade only sporadically.
The uncertain breadth of the ‘33 Act is not the only problem
associated with classifying crypto as a security under the Howey test.
Under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (‘34 Act or Exchange Act),
when crypto is classified as a security, anyone acting to provide
brokerage services becomes subject to the federal securities laws.141
As explained in a recent statement from the SEC (and FINRA), this
can potentially apply to anyone who “buys, sells, or otherwise
transacts or is involved in effecting transactions in digital asset
securities for customers or its own account . . ..”142 In addition to
serving as a trap for the unwary or uninformed, one of the potentially
more problematic requirements when crypto brokers are regulated
under the securities laws involves custodial requirements that even
the SEC and FINRA recognize as including “established laws and
practices regarding the loss or theft of a security, that may not be
available or effective in the case of certain digital assets . . ..”143
140. A list of places where it was possible to “spend” cryptocurrencies in 2020 can be
found at Aziz Bin Zainuddin, Spend Bitcoin: Top Places Accepting Crypto Payments in 2020,
https://masterthecrypto.com/spend-bitcoin/ [https://perma.cc/8H58-9QR7]. Note that
some of the sites listed accept very limited forms of crypto.
In stark contrast to the limited venues in which to spend crypto, there are literally
thousands of calls to “invest in” or “profit” from trading in various cryptoassets. See,
Hunter Kuffel, How (and Where) to Invest in Cryptocurrency, SMARTASSET (Jan. 15, 2020),
[https://perma.cc/9BS6-8X4Y] (touting the opportunity for “big gains” for those who
tolerate big risks); How to Profit from Cryptocurrency, HACKERNOON (Ap. 20, 2019),
[https://perma.cc/SP6K-QBS4]; Top 13 Top Ways to Make Money with Cryptocurrency (In
2020), COINSUTRA (Dec. 9, 2019), [https://perma.cc/DA8V-YYHL]; 8 Ways to make money
with crypto, BITSPARK (Dec. 11, 2019), [https://perma.cc/RP9U-A7WX]; How to Make
Money Investing in Cryptocurrency (in 2019), TRADING STRATEGY GUIDES (Jul. 29, 2019),
[https://perma.cc/FZN6-MFNR]; Ameer Rosic, How to Invest in Cryptocurrencies: The
Ultimate Beginners Guide, BLOCKGEEKS (Feb. 21, 2019), [https://perma.cc/8C5B-QDYF].
141. See Digital Asset Securities, supra note 6.
142. Id. These rules may require any such person to register with the SEC, and
“become a member of and comply with the rules of a self-regulatory organization
(“SRO”), which in most cases is FINRA.” Id. This includes financial responsibility rules
such as those embodied in Rules 15c3-1, 15c3-3, 17a-5, and 17a-13 under the ‘34 Act. These
rules are codified at 17 CFR §§ 240.15c3-1, 15c3-3, 17a-5, 17a-13 (1934).
143. Digital Asset Securities, supra note 6. See 17 CFR § 240.15c3-3 (1934).
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Finally, there are unique problems for crypto exchanges, which
may also be within the reach of securities regulators if the underlying
assets are classified as securities.144 The SEC has taken the position
that crypto exchanges are subject to these rules.145 A public statement
issued by the SEC on November 16, 2018, explicitly declared that “[a]
platform that offers trading in digital asset securities and operates as
an “exchange” (as defined by the federal securities laws) must
register with the Commission as a national securities exchange or be
exempt from registration.”146
Exchange Act Rule 3b-16 provides a functional test to assess
whether an entity meets the definition of an exchange under Section
3(a)(1) of the Exchange Act. An entity that meets the definition of an
exchange must register with the Commission as a national securities
exchange or be exempt from registration, such as by operating as an
alternative trading system (“ATS”) in compliance with Regulation
ATS.147
This array of regulatory responses makes it very difficult for
crypto businesses to function effectively within the borders of the U.S.
As a result, several crypto offerings have been designed to exclude

144. Exchanges are also regulated under the ‘34 Act. See 15 U.S.C. §78c(a)(1) (defining
“exchange,”). See also 15 U.S.C. § 78e (making it unlawful for brokers, dealers, or
exchanges to effect transactions in securities on any unregistered, non-exempt exchange).
145. In the Matter of Zachary Coburn, Exchange Act Release No. 84553 (Nov. 8, 2018)
[hereinafter EtherDelta Opinion] the SEC brought an enforcement action against Zachary
Coburn, who had created and operated the EtherDelta crypto exchange. In that opinion,
the SEC assessed a fine against Coburn, but provided scant guidance on why the exchange
was subject to its jurisdiction. Following citations to the SEC’s DAO Report (see supra note
44), the EtherDelta Opinion merely emphasizes that EtherDelta was designed to operate
with Ether and ERC-20 tokens. EtherDelta Opinion, supra this note, at 9. This appeared to
be sufficient for the SEC to conclude that the exchange needed to operate in compliance
with the securities laws. Cf. Michael J. O’Connor, Overreaching Its Mandate? Considering the
Sec’s Authority to Regulate Cryptocurrency Exchanges, 11 DREXEL L. REV. 539, 539 (2019).
146. Statement on Digital Asset Securities Issuance and Trading, PUBLIC STATEMENT, U.S.
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION (Nov. 16, 2018), [https://perma.cc/XKY2ZHV8].
147. See SEC, Regulation of Exchanges and Alternative Trading Systems, Exchange
Act Rel. No. 40760 (Dec. 8, 1998), 63 FR 70844 (Dec. 22, 1998),
https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-1998-12-22/pdf/98-33299.pdf.
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U.S. investors from participating.148 The Telegram order149 makes the
viability of this approach uncertain, but it may still be the best
available option.150

III. AN EXAMINATION OF HOW THE CURRENT
SYSTEM IS WORKING
Consider the way in which the federal securities laws have been
applied to cryptotransactions. The focus of the ‘33 Act is two-fold: it
requires registration or an exemption, and (regardless of whether an
offering is registered or exempt) it prohibits deceptive, fraudulent, or
manipulative selling practices.151 In furtherance of these objectives,
federal law relies primarily on mandatory disclosures from persons
seeking to sell securities to U.S. citizens. The ostensible benefits of this
kind of disclosure regime include: (1) providing investors with a
reasonable basis on which to make informed investment decisions;
(2) establishing a more equitable apportionment of the costs of
investigating and providing material information; and (3) facilitating
comparison of investment opportunities by mandating uniform
format and content.152 In the context of crypto, however, these
benefits may be more apparent than real.
Even if the special character of cryptoassets was not involved,
there are general criticisms that have been leveled against the SEC’s
148. “Some companies are shunning U.S. investors altogether in order to avoid U.S.
securities law, which generally focuses on where investors are from rather than where the
company is based.” Anna Irrera & Michelle Price, Cryptocurrency issuers clean up, shun U.S.
investors as SEC gets tough, REUTERS (Mar. 21, 2018), [https://perma.cc/D34G-DTMR].
“Executives at Estonia-based iOlite, Scotland-based CaskCoin, UK-based Celsius
Network, and Auctus, told Reuters they were barring U.S. citizens to steer clear of the
SEC.” Id. “Anyone who has recently participated in a cryptocurrency ICO or pre-ICO may
have noticed how these offerings are, in theory not available to residents in the US. … To
put this into perspective, the United States is quite strict when it comes to investment
regulations.” JP Buntinx, Why Can’t US Citizens Participate in Cryptocurrency ICOs? THE
MERKLE (June 29, 2017), [https://perma.cc/A4UW-EB7W].
149. See supra note 118.
150. Although this article does not focus on the role of other agencies, it is probably
worth mentioning that other agencies also regulate crypto in the U.S. The CFTC has been
active in this space, sometimes overlapping with the anti-fraud authority of the SEC. See
CFTC v. McDonnell, 287 F. Supp.3d 213, 222 (E.D.N.Y. 2018). For a more detailed
consideration of the role of the CFTC, see CAROL GOFORTH, REGULATION OF
CRYPTOTRANSACTIONS Chapters 11 & 12 (West Academic, 2020).
151. See The Laws that Govern the Securities Industry, U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE
COMMISSION, https://www.sec.gov/answers/about-lawsshtml.html.
152. See generally Securities Disclosure: Background and Policy Issues, CONGRESSIONAL
RESEARCH SERVICE (June 25, 2019), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/IF11256.pdf.
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insistence on disclosure.153 One of the most common complaints is the
sheer expense of complying with these reporting obligations.154 Given
the complexities of modern financial markets, the cost of preparing
the required disclosures can easily outweigh any benefits gained by
preparing standardized disclosures. As one commentator observed,
“[t]he key SEC disclosure requirements have been substantially
frozen even as banking and financial innovation have undergone
epochal changes.”155 In reality, it is widely recognized that few
investors read or even attempt to understand the disclosures that are
provided.156
The larger problem for offerings of cryptoassets, however, is that
the required disclosures do not hit at the center of issues relevant to a
potential crypto-investor’s interests. Under current rules, the focus of
the mandated disclosures for “securities” offerings is on the issuer
and its business.157 The required offering materials, whether in the
form of a prospectus for a registered offering or offering circular for
private offerings, emphasize the overall financial health of the
issuer’s business, its management, sources of competition, and risks
related to its operations and projections.
These may have nothing to do with the primary risks for
investors in tokens, with the general exception of tokenized
securities158 (unless, for example, the tokens convey an interest in the
issuer’s profits). Perhaps a concrete example will make this clearer.
Consider a social media giant that is publicly held and worth (based
on revenue and profits) more than $100 billion. It wants to issue a

153. “As disclosure requirements and related costs have generally increased over
time, questions have arisen over whether disclosed information is readable and
understandable to investors.” Id. at 2.
154. See Considering an IPO? The Costs of Going and Being Public May Surprise You, PwC
1 (2012), https://www.deschenaux.com/general-informations/E_pwc-cost-of-ipo.pdf.
This source suggests that a company might expect an average of $3.7 million of costs
“directly attributable to their IPO,” plus another $2 million in one-time costs, and about
$1.5 million in recurring costs associated with being public. Id. at 1 fig.1, 10. This is not an
option for the faint of heart. See id.
155. Henry T. C. Hu, Disclosure Universes and Modes of Information: Banks, Innovation,
and Divergent Regulatory Quests, 31 YALE J. ON REG. 565, 565–66 (2014).
156. Tom C.W. Lin, Reasonable Investor(s), 95 B.U. L. REV. 461, 461 (2015) (“Much of
financial regulation is built on a convenient fiction. This fundamental discord has resulted
in a modern financial marketplace of mismatched regulations and misplaced
expectations--a precarious marketplace that has frustrated investors, regulators, and
policymakers.”)
157. See Cybersecurity, supra note 4, at 447.
158. See infra notes 188-91 and accompanying text for a discussion of tokenized
securities.
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cryptocurrency that can be used to purchase goods and services
through its social media platform. While the social media company
plans to have its own wallet service available for users, a tokenholder
can also elect to use third-party wallets and exchange services, and
other users are free to accept the cryptoasset for whatever purposes
they deem appropriate. In this kind of situation, the ultimate success
of the coin has very little to do with the historical value and operation
of the company that is issuing it.159 Nonetheless, the current regime
would require massive disclosures about the social media company’s
owners, its business and operations, even if those are fundamentally
unrelated to the new cryptoasset. Traditional investors in the issuer,
whether they are buying debt or equity interests, are likely to be very
concerned about this kind of information. Someone considering the
new crypto is almost certain to have entirely different concerns and
questions. To the extent that the SEC insists that crypto is a security
and must fit into existing regulatory structures, it is unfortunate that
the securities regulations focus only on the informational needs of
traditional investors.
To understand the interests of crypto-investors, it is important to
consider the nature of the cryptoassets being acquired. In some cases,
a cryptoasset may so closely resemble a traditional security that the
interests of an owner will align with interests of persons who have
purchased conventional debt or equity securities. The reality is that
some forms of crypto will essentially be tokenized securities.160 In
other words, by utilizing smart contracts hosted on a blockchain, an
issuer might choose to issue cryptotokens designed to mirror either
traditional equity or debt interests.161 Under this approach, the tokens
159. The resemblance of this hypothetical asset to Facebook’s originally planned Libra
token is superficial. First, Libra was not being issued by Facebook; it was to be created and
overseen by the Libra Association, which is a Swiss organization of which Facebook was
only one of numerous founding members. Second, Facebook planned to use a subsidiary,
Calibra, to act as the wallet service for the new coin. For various reasons, this separation
of ownership is wise, but it would not have served the purposes of the hypothetical. See
An Introduction to Libra, LIBRA (Sept. 20, 2019, 11:37 AM), [https://perma.cc/DJ6Z-7VQV].
See also Nick Statt, Facebook Confirms it will Launch a Cryptocurrency Called Libra in 2020,
THE VERGE (June 18, 2019), [https://perma.cc/7JKH-H9J6]; Josh Constine, Highlights from
Facebook’s Libra Senate Hearing, TECHCRUNCH (June 2019), [https://perma.cc/XR69YE4G].
160. William Restis, tZERO’s Security Token Offering (STO) Unpacked, RESTISLAW
(Ap. 4, 2018), [https://perma.cc/P5LT-ZT3C].
161. Note that not every reference to a “security token” in public and academic
commentary about crypto means a cryptoasset that resembles traditional debt or equity.
Some commentators use “security token” to refer to any token that is regulated as a
security, regardless of its functional characteristics. Pierre Villenave, Understanding the
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might convey voting rights, a right to share in profits or appreciation,
or a right to interest and principal repayments. For this narrow class
of cryptoasset, it may indeed make sense to impose disclosure
obligations that mirror the kinds of information that must be
provided to potential purchasers of conventional debt and equity
interests.
This is not merely a theoretical possibility. In 2018, Overstock’s
portfolio company tZero issued a token specifically designed to
resemble preferred stock.162 One description of the offering was that
it involved “an ‘exempt’ offering of preferred stock to accredited and
non-U.S. investors . . . issued as an ERC-20 compatible token.”163 For
this kind of crypto offering, traditional disclosure obligations may
work as well as they do for other investors.
However, most tokens are not being structured to operate in this
manner. Either they are structured as cryptocurrencies (designed to
replace government-backed currency),164 or they are designed with
Regulatory
Framework
of
Security
Tokens,
MEDIUM
(Aug.
1,
2018),
https://medium.com/lgogroup/understanding-the-regulatory-framework-of-securitytokens-9b231118cab4 (stating that “[i]n the present state and given the SEC comments, it
seems that most tokens issued through ICO’s will [be] qualified as a security.”) The
BitcoinWiki also uses this definition. See Token, BITCOINWIKI (Oct. 22, 2018, 2:33 PM),
[https://perma.cc/EPT4-T7PN].
162. Alex Lielacher, ICO Tokens 101: Understanding Token Types, BITCOIN MARKET
JOURNAL (Nov. 21, 2017), [https://perma.cc/5CNF-ZFJG] (suggesting that new tokens
from tZero, a portfolio company of Overstock, Inc., would fit this categorization.).
163. Restis, supra note 160.
164. “Cryptocurrency” is also a word that is not used consistently. While it has been
widely used, its meaning must be ascertained from the context in which it is employed.
Often, “cryptocurrency” is used to describe both coins and tokens, regardless of how they
are intended to function. One source, for example, says that “cryptocurrency” is generally
understood as covering the realm of exchangeable value coins and tokens. See Aziz Bin
Zainuddin, Coins, Tokens & Altcoins: What’s the Difference?, MASTERTHECRYPTO (Apr. 11,
2019, 8:22 AM), [https://perma.cc/M4RA-CQHP] (“. . . [A]ll coins and tokens are
regarded as cryptocurrencies, even if most of the coins do not function as a currency or
medium of exchange.”). This same source suggest that “cryptocurrency” is a misnomer,
since many coins and tokens that followed Bitcoin do not possess the traditional
characteristics of currency such as being a unit of account, a store of value, and a medium
of exchange. Id. Coinmarketcap, a website that tracks what it calls cryptocurrency
capitalization, divides cryptocurrencies into coins and tokens. See Today’s Cryptocurrency
Prices by Market Cap, COINMARKETCAP, https://coinmarketcap.com. Some sources
disagree with this taxonomy and instead limit “cryptocurrency” to the world of coins,
using the term “cryptotoken” to refer to tokens. See Bin Zainuddin, supra this note. Tokens
often have functions other than serving as a substitute for traditional currencies, which is
why some commentators object to them being classified as cryptocurrencies. Some early
commentators also appear to have assumed that “coin” meant something that was like a
currency, while token must have been intended to have a different meaning. In still other
contexts, the word “cryptocurrency” is used to describe all cryptoassets that are designed
and intended to function as replacements for traditional currency. In this case, the
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functions other than replacing debt or equity investment (such as
access to goods and services, enriching user experience, as an inapplication reward, or otherwise).165 Investors in these kinds of
cryptoassets are likely to have concerns that differ considerably from
those of conventional investors.
For example, it is not likely to be important to a crypto-investor
(excluding cases involving tokenized securities) to know who owns
the outstanding shares of the issuer. The qualifications and
management of the issuer may be similarly disconnected from the
primary interests of a crypto-investor, unless their function is to work
with the new cryptoasset. The financial history and business
operations of the issuer may also be unrelated to the concerns of
someone interested in a new cryptoasset, as will sources of
competition faced by the issuer in a pre-existing line of business.
What are the primary interests of someone contemplating an
investment in crypto? First, it will be important for the coin or token
to be described. What is it intended to do? How far along is it in
development? How will it operate? How will it be issued? How many
coins or tokens have been pre-mined or distributed, and for what
consideration? Is there a cap on the total number of tokens to be
created, and if so, what is it? Can the cap be changed? How disperse
is the ownership of the cryptoasset?166 How many of the outstanding
coins or tokens are owned by the issuer, the team creating the asset,
or an affiliate of such person(s)? Who are the members of the token
development team, and what are their qualifications? What will be
the policies on hard forks? How are errors or weaknesses in the
protocol to be addressed or remedied? Under what circumstances
will transactions be reversed or stopped? What privacy protocols are
in place, and are they mandatory or optional? Who will be working
on promotion of the coin or token? Are there restrictions or
limitations on resale? Are there existing exchanges that accept the
asset? If not, will anyone be working on finding an exchange or
trading platform that will include the coin or token among their
interests? Even though these are issues likely to be the most relevant

designation refers to the currency function of the cryptoasset, rather than describing a
presumed technical difference between coins and tokens. See Cryptionary, supra note 23 at
69.
165. For an explanation of some of these functions, see The Importance of Token Utility,
Function & Purpose, THE COINIST, https://www.coinist.io/ico-importance-of-designingutility-function-purpose-into-coin/.
166. This is different from the equity ownership in the issuer.
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for crypto investors, these are not the kind of disclosures that are
specifically mandated for securities.
It might be argued that because this information is “material,” it
needs to be disclosed even under the existing requirements.167
However, the securities laws do not mandate disclosure of everything
that an issuer might know. That is part of the proposal that this
Article makes: the SEC needs to devote resources to articulating the
types of disclosures particularly germane to crypto offerings rather
than having to litigate the preliminary question of whether the asset
is a security at all. It is not enough for the SEC to argue that crypto is
a security, and then expect that compliance with inapt disclosure
requirements will adequately protect investors. Instead, the
requirement simply halts innovation or drives it out of the country.
When plaintiffs allege that the defendants violated the Securities
Act by omitting information required to be included in the
registration statement, courts employ two accepted methods of
determining whether a duty exists for the offeror to disclose certain
information. First, an offeror is duty-bound to disclose all material
information required to be disclosed by statute. Second, an offeror
has a duty to disclose any additional information required to make
another statement, whether required or voluntarily made, not
misleading.168
In other words, liability exists when an issuer fails to include
material information that is “required to be stated.”169 It is widely
recognized by the federal courts that not everything known or
knowable by an issuer must be disclosed simply because investors
would regard it as important.170 Thus, under current rules some
relevant risks may not be disclosed, while the company is forced to

167. This might be in accordance with the overall objectives of the federal securities
laws, and the ‘33 Act in particular. “The primary goal of the 1933 Securities Act was simply
to require securities issuers to disclose all material information necessary for investors to
be able to make informed investment decisions on stocks.” The 1933 Securities Act - “The
Truth
in
Securities
Act,”
CFI,
https://corporatefinanceinstitute.com/resources/knowledge/trading-investing/1933securities-act-truth-securities/.
168. ELGA A. GOODMAN ET. AL, Elements of a Section 11 claim—Omissions, materiality,
and the duty to disclose, in 50A N.J. PRAC., BUSINESS LAW DESKBOOK § 30:54 (2018-2019 ED.)
(footnotes omitted). A third option is also suggested by the authors of this practice note,
but that option focuses on situations involving insider trading.
169. Securities Act of 1933 § 11, 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a).
170. J & R Marketing, SEP v. General Motors Corp., 549 F.3d 384, 384 (6th Cir. 2008);
Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 239 (1988); Mayer v. Mylod, 988 F.2d 635, 639 (6th Cir.
1993).
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prepare and present irrelevant information that purports to be what
investors need to know.
In addition, even if the crypto-specific information is disclosed,
it would be buried in a mountain of information that is not
particularly relevant. This would substantially decrease the chance
that the important information would be reasonably accessible while
simultaneously increasing the expense of preparing the disclosure
document.
Moreover, if the law is read as requiring such disclosures, by
failing to include any explanation of what kind of information is
“material” in the context of a crypto distribution, the risk that an
issuer could inadvertently omit relevant information later deemed
important is substantially increased. Finally, by requiring disclosure
of all material information, the securities laws appear to be placing an
unreasonable burden on issuers. As described earlier in this Article,171
even if it is possible to identify an issuer, that person is unlikely is
unlikely to be in a good position to report on the kinds of information
that might be deemed material, under the vague current standards.
For example, one of the most significant considerations for
persons contemplating an investment in crypto relates to market
volatility. In most cases, however, that risk is not attributable to the
developer or issuer of a cryptoasset.172 The issuer or developer of a
cryptoasset is typically in no better position than investors to predict
how the market will behave. In addition, some crypto investors
actively seek to benefit from volatility,173 and the degree to which
individual investors tolerate risk will also vary widely. These factors
make it virtually impossible for an issuer to accurately warn every
investor about the “problem” of volatility-based risks.

171. See supra Part II.C.
172. It is, of course, possible that a crypto developer could create a cryptoasset with
the intention of manipulating its subsequent market price in order to benefit from ensuing
volatility. A developer willing to do this, however, is unlikely to voluntarily disclose this
intention regardless of the existence of a regulatory mandate to do so. The mandate would
thus apply to developers and issuers attempting to act in good faith, leaving them with
an obligation to predict the behavior of others, including those who might seek to increase
price volatility.
173. As one source notes, volatility means that the crypto market “has the potential to
generate massive amounts of return.” Aziz Bin Zainuddin, Crypto Volatility: Why Volatility
is
Important
in
the
Cryptocurrency
Market,
MASTERTHECRYPTO,
https://masterthecrypto.com/crypto-volatility-important-cryptocurrency-market/
(noting that investors face a “high risk of losing a significant amount of capital,” and
warns that investors need to assess their ability and willingness to accept those risks
before purchasing crypto.)
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Another potential problem outside the issuer’s knowledge or
control is the risk that the crypto will be lost because of a failure of
cybersecurity.174 This is, in fact, one of the largest risks faced by
purchasers. Despite the increases in cyber security practices and
procedures, the rate of hacking of crypto exchanges and wallet
services actually appears to be increasing.175 On the other hand, not
only is the issuer unlikely to have any special knowledge about cyber
security risks, the issuer does not necessarily have anything to do
with selecting the exchange or wallet service upon which the
purchaser ultimately relies.176 Requiring the issuer to explain and
evaluate risks that are in the control of the purchaser than the issuer
seems counterintuitive at best.
In evaluating the scope of the SEC’s current approach, SEC
Commission Hester Peirce, sometimes called the Crypto Mom
because of her pro-crypto remarks in various venues,177 has
complained about the agency’s failure to provide clear guidelines for
crypto businesses.178 One of her more colorful complaints is that the

174. See Cybersecurity, supra note 4.
175. Can
They
Be
Stopped?,
COINTELEGRAPH
(June
18,
2019),
https://cointelegraph.com/news/round-up-of-crypto-exchanges-hack-so-far-in-2019how-can-it-be-stopped. See also Clare Baldwin, Bitcoin Worth $72 Million Stolen from
Bitfinex Exchange in Hong Kong, REUTERS (Aug. 3, 2016, 1:30 AM),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-bitfinex-hackcd-hongkong/bitcoin-worth-72million-stolen-from-bitfinex-exchange-in-hong-kong-idUSKCN10E0KP; Olga Kharif,
Record Crypto Heist Raises the Appeal of a New Type of Exchange, BLOOMBERG (Jan. 29, 2018,
6:00 PM) [https://perma.cc/32R3-UL8A].
176. In the case of an IEO, or Initial Exchange Offer, this might not hold true. In a more
conventional ICO, a token development company or team generally sells its newly created
tokens directly to investors (or sells the right to obtain tokens once they are fully
functional). In an IEO, the development group sells its tokens through a crypto exchange
platform. The exchange essentially acts as a broker, dealer, or underwriter for the
distribution, and in this case, the actual creator of the crypto does have something to do
with at least the initial exchange that will host the crypto. See generally Benjamin Vitaris,
What Is an Initial Exchange Offering (IEO) and How It Differs From ICO? CRYPTOPOTATO
(updated Ap. 29, 2019), https://cryptopotato.com/what-is-an-initial-exchange-offeringieo-and-how-it-differs-from-ico/; Brian Curran, What Is an IEO? Complete Guide to Initial
Exchange Offerings, BLOCKONOMI (Ap. 5, 2019), https://blockonomi.com/what-is-an-ieo/.
Note, however, that the mere fact that the issuer selects the initial exchange does not mean
that the issuer is in a better position than anyone else to assess the probability of the
exchange being hacked. There seems to be no reason why an issuer would willfully or
intentionally select an exchange that lacks reasonable security precautions.
177. See Christine Kim, Crypto Mom’s Crusade: Inside the SEC, Hester Peirce Is Putting
Up a Fight, COINDESK (Dec. 31, 2018), https://www.coindesk.com/coindesks-mostinfluential-2018-blockchain-hester-peirce.
178. See Ana Alexandre, SEC Commissioner Hester Peirce Concerned Crypto Industry
Hindered
by
Regulatory
Delays,
COINTELEGRAPH
(May
9,
2019),
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SEC has engaged in a “Jackson Pollock approach” to regulation.179
When this scattershot approach is applied to the kinds of disclosures
that are required, with many requirements being relevant to only a
small fraction of crypto offerings, it paints the picture of a regulatory
approach that fails in the ultimate mission of the agency: the
protection of the public and the markets.
None of this should be taken as a blanket condemnation of the
SEC’s efforts. The SEC’s vigilance in warning about fraudulent
practices, investigating problematic issuers, and enforcing antifraud
requirements are all commendable.180 Unfortunately, the value of
these efforts does not justify the wasted assets in pursuing expensive
litigation over what constitutes a security and whether legally
required disclosures have been made (regardless of the value of such
information to potential purchasers).181

IV. EARLIER SUGGESTIONS FOR CHANGE

https://cointelegraph.com/news/sec-commissioner-hester-peirce-concerned-cryptoindustry-hindered-by-regulatory-delays.
179. Peirce Speech, supra note 18. This observation was made in the context of
considering the multi-factored approach currently being taken by the SEC in evaluating
whether a particular cryptoasset qualifies as a security.
180. A list of SEC investor warnings and alerts related to digital assets can be found
by a search of “digital assets” on the SEC’s Investor.gov pages. See Investor.gov, U.S.
SECURITIES
AND
EXCHANGE
COMMISSION,
https://www.investor.gov/search?keys=digital%20assets. A list of enforcement actions
by the SEC relating to ICOs (including those that do not involve fraud) can be accessed.
See Cyber Enforcement Actions, U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION,
https://www.sec.gov/spotlight/cybersecurity-enforcement-actions (listing a few actions
that allege only a failure to register the offering, but the vast majority of the SEC’s
complaints also involve claims of fraud, non-disclosure, and/or manipulation.).
181. This is not the only inefficiency in the current system. Another problem, not
highlighted in great detail in this Article, is the existence of overlapping concurrent
jurisdiction as between the SEC and CFTC. The CFTC has extensive experience in
regulating derivatives and derivative exchanges, and since it is possible to have crypto
derivatives the involvement of that agency seems entirely appropriate. See Written
Testimony of Chairman J. Christopher Giancarlo before the Senate Banking Committee,
Washington,
D.C.,
CFTC
(Feb.
6,
2018),
https://cftc.gov/PressRoom/SpeechesTestimony/opagiancarlo37. On the other hand, it
seems duplicative to have both the SEC and CFTC expend time and effort in overseeing
fraud in the spot markets (where actual transactions in the underlying commodities take
place). Unfortunately, “[u]ntil Congress clarifies the matter, the CFTC has concurrent
authority, along with other state and federal administrative agencies, and civil and
criminal courts, over dealings in virtual currency.” CFTC v. McDonnell, 287 F. Supp. 3d
213, 217 (E.D.N.Y.), adhered to on denial of reconsideration, 321 F. Supp. 3d 366 (E.D.N.Y.
2018).
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Other commentators have noted the disconnect between what
the SEC is supposed to do and what its extensive disclosure
requirements are actually accomplishing.182 Some have simply
concluded that the SEC needs to add precision to its approach to
crypto,183 while others have offered more detailed proposals. None of
these proposals, however, fully address the shortcomings of the
current system, or they introduce problems of their own.
One commentator has suggested that the U.S. should move to a
system that allows accredited institutional investors, and perhaps
other wealthy investors with slightly reduced sophistication
standards, to invest freely in cryptoassets.184 This approach would not
impose mandatory affirmative disclosures and instead would impose
liability only for fraud or other deceitful behaviors. Unfortunately,
moving solely to this type of anti-fraud regime185 has some significant
problems. First, it fails to recognize that some crypto is likely to take
the form of tokenized securities that genuinely mirrors traditional
debt or equity.186 In these cases, it seems appropriate to retain current
disclosure obligations. Even for other kinds of crypto, while most
current disclosures are unlikely to be helpful, a limited amount of
information probably should be required.187 For example,
information about the function, design, control, and pre-sale
ownership of the particular cryptoasset would be relevant when an
182. See Shlomit Azgad-Tromer, Crypto Securities: On the Risks of Investments in
Blockchain-Based Assets and The Dilemmas of Securities Regulation, 68 AM. U. L. REV. 69, 112–
30 (2018); Nathan J. Hochman, Policing the Wild West of Cryptocurrency Part II, L.A. LAW.
26, 28 (Dec. 2018).
183. E.g., Allen Kogan, Not All Virtual Currencies Are Created Equal: Regulatory Guidance
in the Aftermath of CFTC v. McDonnell, 8 Am. U. Bus. L. Rev. 199, 199 (2019).
184. See Azgad-Tromer, supra note 182 at 131. This does not address the problem of
how to allow smaller investors to participate in crypto markets. Limiting them to
secondary trading transactions where there are no minimum disclosures expected may
make the system harder for them to navigate, although this proposal would certainly offer
major relief to the entrepreneurs seeking to participate in the space.
185. Azgad-Tromer’s objections to the current disclosure regime start with the reality
that the reason behind the current paradigm is the SEC’s desire “to remove the
information asymmetry between investors and offerors so as to promote informed
investment decisions.” See Azgad-Tromer, supra note 182 at 105.
186. Some commentators have suggested that this will be the next direction for crypto.
See The Next Big Wave is Security Tokens or Tokenized Securities to Provide Liquidity, BITCOIN
EXCHANGE GUIDE (Sept. 12, 2018), [https://perma.cc/5WER-H632]. However, as of the
date of this article this has not yet materialized, possibly because of the uncertain
regulatory regime.
187. While much of this may already appear somewhere in the whitepaper or
investment information provided by the issuer or promoter of particular crypto-projects,
there is a significant benefit to having consistent, uniform platforms for providing basic
data. See Azgad-Tromer, supra note 182 at 107.
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issuer releases tokenized securities, or when an issuer or other person
in the business of promoting the asset seeks to sell “true”
cryptocurrencies (i.e., cryptoassets specifically designed to serve as
fiat currency substitutes). Other forms of crypto specifically marketed
as speculative investments might also require specific disclosures in
order to protect potential purchasers.
In addition, this suggested approach would limit sales of crypto
to wealthy, sophisticated investors, which seems antithetical to the
democratic ideals of blockchain technology and is therefore likely to
be objectionable to many within the crypto community.188 Finally, it
is unlikely that legislators will have the political will to force the SEC
to abandon its emphasis on disclosure,189 while a change to reviewing
different kinds of disclosures might be more palatable.
Another possibility that has been raised is to create a new
regulatory agency to oversee cryptoassets in lieu of the Securities and
Exchange Commission and other authorities.190 Admittedly, the
current situation, which involves multiple federal and state
authorities with concurrent and overlapping jurisdiction over
cryptoassets, includes a substantial risk of over-regulation and
unnecessary complexity.191 It is certainly possible that a new agency
could be created to avoid the problems currently faced by the SEC.
Similarly, a new agency could remedy the CFTC’s inability to
188. The SEC is logically more concerned about protecting the average citizen, or
“main street investor.” The presumption is that persons who have sufficient expertise in
investing or the wealth to hire professional advisors are less in need of the SEC’s
protection and regulated disclosures. However, this approach means that sales designed
to comply with an exemption by being limited to wealthy, well-educated persons excludes
the average citizen. It is this which is antithetical to the original underpinnings of Bitcoin
and blockchain technology. See Alex Tapscott, Blockchain Democracy: Government Of The
People, By The People, For The People, FORBES (Aug. 16, 2016), [https://perma.cc/9CEDPVF3] (“Blockchain is a vast, global distributed ledger or database running on millions of
devices and open to anyone, where not just information but anything of value – money,
but also titles, deeds, identities, even votes – can be moved, stored and managed securely
and privately– and where trust can be established through mass collaboration and clever
code rather than by powerful intermediaries like governments and banks.”).
189. This is a problem noted by other scholars. Azgad-Tromer, supra note 182 at 119
(commenting on probable political opposition by the SEC and politically powerful stock
exchanges).
190. See Hochman, supra note 182 at 31. Hochman argues, “[n]ow, it is time for
Congress to create the CEC as the federal ‘crypro-sheriff’ to strike the right balance in
reining in the Wild West of Cryptocurrency.” Id. at 31.
191. At the federal level, FinCEN, the CFTC, the SEC, and the IRS have authority over
cryptoassets. This does not even include state authorities and other agencies, such as the
FTC, that may have jurisdiction over limited aspects of crypto. See Carol Goforth, US Law:
Crypto is Money, Property, a Commodity, and a Security, all at the Same Time, OXFORD BUS. L.
BLOG (Dec. 7, 2018), [https://perma.cc/4ZNM-7WBM] [hereinafter US Law].
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regulate spot market transactions, and FinCEN’s “inability to impose
uniform national regulation and enforcement of money series
businesses currently subject to the myriad of state licensing
regimes.”192
Despite the superficial attractiveness of this alternative, it is not
likely to be a realistic option. First, consider the current antiregulatory environment in which we operate.193 The myriad problems
posed by the Covid-19 pandemic caused the Trump administration
to further push its anti-regulatory agenda.194 In addition to the
political obstacles, there are real world reasons to avoid this
approach. The U.S. budget deficit is a bigger problem than crypto is
likely to be in the foreseeable future.195 A new agency would have to
192. Hochman, supra note 182 at 31.
193. Jeff Cox, The anti-regulatory environment that Trump promised just got a big boost,
CNBC (Nov. 19, 2017), [https://perma.cc/W8AQ-YECL] (commenting on President
Donald Trump’s promises to create a less restrictive regulatory environment, particularly
in banking). Obviously, the political regime has changed, but opposition to what is widely
seen as excessive regulation goes far beyond the Trump administration. See, e.g., Overregulated America, THE ECONOMIST (Feb. 18, 2012), [https://perma.cc/G8F9-Z25M]. This
statement seems to encapsulate widely held views about the value of regulation. H.
Beales, et al., “Government Regulation: The Good, The Bad, & The Ugly”, REGULATORY
TRANSPARENCY PROJECT OF THE FEDERALIST SOCIETY (June 12, 2017),
https://regproject.org/wp-content/uploads/RTP-Regulatory-Process-Working-GroupPaper.pdf [https://perma.cc/J2K3-MYYS] (“The American free enterprise system has
been one of the greatest engines for prosperity and liberty in history, and has the potential
to deliver a promising future for the United States and the world. . . . Yet, the United States
faces growing challenges in an increasingly competitive global economy. Recent decades
have seen a decline in economic growth and innovation, and one important cause is
poorly-designed government policies. Large swaths of the American economy are
distorted by government mandates and incentives, and the vast majority of binding
“laws” are not enacted by our elected representatives in Congress, but are promulgated
by agencies as regulations.”)
194. See generally Jeff Stein & Robert Costa, White House readies push to slash regulations
as major part of its coronavirus economic recovery plan, THE WASHINGTON POST (Ap. 21, 2020),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2020/04/21/white-house-coronavirusregulations/. The anti-regulatory approach was initiated early in President Trump’s term
when he signed an executive order requiring agencies to identify at least two regulations
that could be targeted every time a new regulation is proposed. Nolan D. McCaskill &
Matthew Nussbaum, Trump signs executive order requiring that for every one new regulation,
two
must
be
revoked,
POLITICO
(Jan.
1,
2017),
https://www.politico.com/story/2017/01/trump-signs-executive-order-requiring-thatfor-every-one-new-regulation-two-must-be-revoked-234365. See Richard L. Revesz,
Congress and the Executive: Challenging the Anti-Regulatory Narrative, 2018 MICH. ST. L. REV.
795, 795 (2018) (noting the in midst of the current anti-regulatory zealousness, cost-benefit
analysis of various regulations being repealed has been over-looked).
195. For a simplified explanation of the problems posed by the federal deficit, see
Heather Long, Why America’s return to $1 trillion deficits is a big problem for you, WASH. POST
(Ap. 9, 2018), [https://perma.cc/4EAV-J3BL]. This assessment was written before the
massive increases in our national debt that have occurred since that date. During 2019, the
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be authorized, housed, staffed, and provided with sufficient
resources to fulfill its mandate. It would need to be able to investigate
and enforce crypto-focused requirements, presumably taking over
issues currently regulated by the SEC and CFTC, as well as possibly
implicating FinCEN’s jurisdiction. In addition, each of these agencies
is likely to object to having their jurisdiction reduced simply in order
to create a new agency that will have to be created, funded, staffed,
and generally brought up to speed (with concomitant delays and
expense). Finally, the success of a new agency would depend entirely
on the mandate that it was handed.196 If it, too, chooses or is directed
to start from the current disclosure paradigm, focusing on
information about the business of the issuer or creator of a
cryptoasset, it will suffer from many of the same problems as the
existing system.
Other suggestions have focused on modifying the existing
paradigm affecting cryptoassets in more limited ways. One such
approach would be to reconfigure the Howey test. Probably the
simplest option would be for courts to narrowly construe Howey so
as to exclude most “utility tokens” from its reach.197 This approach
has been advocated by SAFT proponents for some time,198 but the SEC
seems disinclined to follow it.199 The most recent judicial

national debt swelled by $1.1 trillion to exceed $23 trillion. The Treasury Department
projected a budget deficit of nearly $400 billion for the first four months of fiscal 2020, a
25% gain over the prior year.
Jeff Cox, US deficit surges 25% in fiscal 2020 and is $1.1 trillion over the past year, CNBC (Feb
12, 2020), https://www.cnbc.com/2020/02/12/us-deficit-swells-25percent-in-fiscal2020-up-1point1-trillion-over-past-year.html. These numbers do not take into account the
additional $2 trillion coronavirus stimulus bailout passed in March 2020. Emily Cochrane
& Nicholas Fandos, Senate Approves $2 Trillion Stimulus After Bipartisan Deal, THE N.Y.
TIMES
(March
25,
2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/25/us/politics/coronavirus-senate-deal.html.
196. In fact, adding another agency to the mix is only likely to complicate matters.
Current agencies are unlikely to voluntarily cede their authority, meaning that a new
agency is likely to have to deal with rules and requirements overseen by FinCEN (the
Financial Crimes Enforcement Network), the CFTC (the Commodities Futures Trading
Commission), the SEC (Securities and Exchange Commission), and the IRS (Internal
Revenue Service), unless the new agency is given exclusive authority. See US Law, supra
note 191. It would, of course, also need preemptive authority to ameliorate the impact of
diverse regulations at the state level as well.
197. Nate Crosser, Initial Coin Offerings As Investment Contracts: Are Blockchain Utility
Tokens Securities?, 67 U. KAN. L. REV. 379, 409 (2018).
198. See generally Batiz-Benet, Clayburgh, & Santori, supra note 116 (giving a brief
description of SAFTs).
199. See supra Part II.B., discussing the Kik and Telegram litigation in which the SEC
strongly asserted its position that a SAFT offering for utility tokens were securities. The
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pronouncement also suggests that this is unlikely to prevail in the
courts under current rules.200
A similar, but more complicated, suggestion would require the
courts to adopt some specific requirements in order for a cryptoasset
to be classified as a security under Howey.201 This proposal, advanced
by Professors M. Todd Henderson and Max Raskin in 2019, suggests
the use of two specific tests, one affecting the “efforts of others”
prong, and the other relating to the “expectation of profits” prong.202
Under the first prong, a cryptoasset would be excluded from the
definition of a security if it is sufficiently decentralized because there
would then be no “other” party to satisfy the Howey requirement that
a purchaser be relying on the “essential efforts” of others.203 This is
not a huge leap from the analysis advocated by the SEC or employed
by most courts, but unless the Supreme Court adopts this approach,
the SEC will continue to focus resources on litigating the issue.
The second element would prevent an asset from being classified
as a security so long as the promoters are making good faith efforts
to develop a product reasonably intended to have functionality for
some users beyond a profits interest.204 This would require a
significant shift in focus for the SEC, since it deviates from the notion
that a token “in development” generally involves reliance on the
efforts of the promoter or associated persons for a return on the
investment.205 Moreover, it is a far different thing to say that an asset
should not be considered a security so long as some purchasers may
be acquiring the asset for its functionality rather than asking whether
it is foreseeable that some purchasers will be making a speculative
investment. Since the SEC’s objective is to protect investors, and the
utility of the Kin token and the Grams at issue in those two cases related to the underlying
Kik and Telegram social media platforms.
200. Id.
201. M. Todd Henderson & Max Raskin, A Regulatory Classification of Digital Assets:
Toward an Operational Howey Test for Cryptocurrencies, ICOs, and Other Digital Assets, 2019
COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 443, 491 (2019). For a reminder about the elements of the conventional
Howey test, see supra notes 28-35 and accompanying text.
202. Id. This article labels the first the “Bahamas test,” which is explained as asking
whether the sudden departure of the sellers to someplace like the Bahamas for a perpetual
retirement would affect the value of the asset. Id. at 461. The second is referred to as the
“Substantial Steps Test.” Id. at 478. This test essentially says that the asset will not be a
security if the promoters are “taking good faith, substantial steps towards completion of
a product that they believe will have use to some users of the token beyond resale value
or economic income.” Id. at 483.
203. Id. at 460-61.
204. Id. at 483.
205. See Framework, supra note 6 at 3-4.
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agency shows no indication that it is willing to find a pre-functional
interest to be anything other than a security,206 this is unlikely to be a
practical suggestion.
Other more complicated options have also been advanced. One
commentator suggested relying on token protocols to establish terms
that could be codified into a new exemption from registration.207
Advocates of this suggestion proposed that regulators and Ethereum,
as the platform that originally hosted the large majority of tokens and
from which most ICOs were launched, jointly agree on best practices
which, if adopted as part of the computer coding for new tokens,
would support exempting the new assets from existing registration
requirements.208 Even assuming such agreement is possible, it is not
certain that Ethereum will continue to be the primary platform for
hosting tokens and ICO; certainly other options now exist.209 It is also
likely that it would be difficult for regulators to monitor coding for
new assets and ensure that work-arounds were not also embedded
into the software.210 Importantly, the SEC shows no indication that it
is even willing to consider this approach.
Many other suggestions, some very narrow and some quite
broad, have also been advance. One particularly narrow alternative
would simply exclude tokens issued by a DAO from the ambit of the

206. Even the proponents of the SAFT generally concur that the initial pre-functional
stage where purchasers are asked to buy contractual rights to purchase utility tokens
when issued involves the sale of a security. See generally supra note 116 (giving a brief
discussion of the SAFT process).
207. Randolph A. Robinson II, The New Digital Wild West: Regulating the Explosion of
Initial Coin Offerings, 85 TENN. L. REV. 897, 957 (2018).
208. Id. at 956. The author posits that “[b]ecause the majority of ICOs are currently
launched on the Ethereum platform the SEC should encourage and work with Ethereum
developers to integrate legal principles directly into the code that governs the platform.”
Id.
209. See Where to Issue ICO Tokens: Platforms Review, COINTELEGRAPH,
https://cointelegraph.com/ico-101/where-to-issue-ico-tokens-platforms-review (noting
a number of issues with Ethereum as a platform, as well as identifying a number of
alternatives, including Eos, Tezos, Waves, NEO, NEM, and Stellar).
210. Current review of textual information in the very-familiar registration statement
already takes the SEC weeks or months. See Steven Skolnicka & Alan Wovsanikera, The
Jobs Act: Improving Access To Capital Markets For Smaller Businesses in RECENT
DEVELOPMENTS IN SECURITIES LAW 1, 3 (ed. 2016); Stuart R. Cohn, The Impact of Securities
Laws on Developing Companies: Would the Wright Brothers Have Gotten Off the Ground?, 3 J.
SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 315, 366 n.104 (1999) (noting that first time filers can generally
expect “weeks” of review of their registration statement). There is no way to predict how
long it might take the SEC to review disclosures embedded in computer code.

316

HASTINGS BUSINESS LAW JOURNAL

17:2

securities laws.211 This would only address a small number of
distributions as most tokens would not fit within that categorization.
At the other end of the spectrum, another approach would
completely remove crypto from the reach of the securities laws by
treating it as virtual currency.212 This approach seems overly broad,
as the SEC does have an extremely reasonable interest and expertise
in the case of tokenized securities cast as cryptoassets and certainly
has a legitimate concern about fraud in the broader crypto setting.
Other advocates for “clarity” in the SEC’s approach make the case
that it is desirable to readily distinguish between interests that are
securities and those that are not,213 but fail to consider that there may
be benefits to applying the anti-fraud requirements even if would
make little sense to apply existing registration requirements.
One final proposal merits discussion, and that is one advanced
by SEC Commissioner Hester Peirce. On February 6, 2020,
Commissioner Peirce unveiled a proposal that in her words would
“fill the gap between regulation and decentralization.”214 At the time
of her original proposal, Commissioner Peirce was very careful to
remind everyone that the opinions she expressed were her own and
that the proposal was “not fully formed in my own mind and may
not reflect my own opinions in the months to come.”215 Her proposal
started with the belief that the SEC’s current approach resulted in
“well-intentioned” persons “struggling to find a way both to comply
with the law and accomplish their laudable objectives.”216 As a result,
Commissioner Peirce proposed a safe harbor for network developers
in which they would have three years in which to “facilitate
participation in and the development of a functional or decentralized
network” that would not be within the ambit of the securities laws
presumably because market forces rather than the efforts of any
identifiable persons would dictate pricing.217
211. Tiffany L. Minks, Ethereum and the Sec: Why Most Distributed Autonomous
Organizations Are Subject to the Registration Requirements of the Securities Act of 1933 and A
Proposal for New Regulation, 5 TEX. A&M L. REV. 405, 405 (2018).
212. See Susan Alkadri, Defining and Regulating Cryptocurrency: Fake Internet Money or
Legitimate Medium of Exchange?, DUKE L. & TECH. REV., 71, 77 (2018).
213. See Justin Henning, The Howey Test: Are Crypto-Assets Investment Contracts?, 27 U.
MIAMI BUS. L. REV. 51, 52 (2018) (advocating for clarification in the definition).
214. Hester M. Peirce, Running on Empty: A Proposal to Fill the Gap Between Regulation
and Decentralization, U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION (Feb. 6, 2020),
https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/peirce-remarks-blockress-2020-02-06.
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Peirce, Empty, supra note 214.
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The conditions for the proposed safe harbor include the
following: (1) the development team must intend to reach network
maturity (defined as either decentralization or token functionality)
within three years; (2) key information would need to be publicly
disclosed;218 (3) the token would need to be sold for the purpose of
facilitating access to, participation on, or development of the
network;219 (4) there must be reasonable efforts to create liquidity for
users; and (5) the developers would need to notify the SEC that it is
relying on the safe harbor.220
While this proposal generated considerable comment among
crypto-enthusiasts, it has not gained any traction at the SEC.221 It has
been said that “the commission has little motivation and limited time
to devote to helping the crypto industry given that the industry has
been so problematic, having been an outsized thorn in their side for
the last few years . . ..”222 In addition, this approach still leaves the
SEC in the position of having to argue that crypto is a security under
the existing statutory definition,223 and it cannot remove problems
caused by overlapping authority with the CFTC.224

V. A DIFFERENT APPROACH
Rather than suggesting that the courts and the SEC modify the
Howey test to avoid classifying some forms of crypto as securities, or
218. The proposal discusses the kind of information that would need to be disclosed,
and it focuses on the source code and transaction history as being of “primary
importance.” Id. In reality, very few individuals would be capable of understanding the
source code or the significance of many provisions included in the programming.
However, the proposal would also require disclosure of information that is of more
obvious importance to potential purchasers, including information about the launch and
supply process, the total number of authorized tokens, the release schedule, how tokens
are generated or mined, the process for burning tokens, the transaction validation process,
the consensus mechanism and governance mechanisms for implementing changes to the
network. Id. Information about the plan of development and intended functionality would
also be needed. Id.
219. Commissioner Peirce explains that this element is intended to prevent “equity or
debt securities masquerading as tokens” from relying on this safe harbor. Id.
220. Id.
221. See, i.e., Ben Jessel, Can Hester Peirce’s Safe Harbor Proposal Save Cryptocurrency?
Experts Weigh In, FORBES (Apr. 1, 2020), [https://perma.cc/XL6E-X2JB] (“While the
proposal has attracted a lot of interest and commentary it has little chance of making it
into law, for a multitude of reasons.”).
222. Id.
223. See supra Part II.B. for a consideration of two of the latest cases where this has
been (and as of this writing, for one of those cases still is) an issue.
224. See supra note 181 for a brief explanation of this issue.
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that the SEC alone should be counted on to remedy the problems
created by the current regime, this Article suggests that almost all225
of such assets should be included within the ambit of the federal
securities laws. This would require legislative intervention, and
ideally the amendments would also provide the SEC with exclusive
and preemptive jurisdiction over the new asset class while
incorporating a legislative mandate that the SEC adopt appropriate
exemptions premised on limited disclosure obligations. This
suggestion is developed more fully in the next section of this Article.
Both the SEC and courts are currently wed to the Howey
investment contract analysis in considering which cryptoassets are
securities. As described above, this leads to extensive and expensive
delays and uncertainties, and it has spawned a wide range of
suggestions (often at odds with each other) about how the test might
be modified. In reality, the Howey test is much like forcing
Cinderella’s slipper onto the feet of her stepsisters; it does not fit well,
and it is painful.226 The solution is not to try and lop off toes and heels,
but to find a different choice of footwear.
In order to move away from Howey, however, a number of things
must happen. The first four steps all take Congressional action. First,
Congress should amend the definition of security in the federal
securities laws to explicitly recognize cryptoassets as a new class of
security. Second, Congress should give the SEC exclusive authority
over this asset class, although the CFTC would retain jurisdiction
over derivatives of such assets and the exchanges upon which such
derivatives are traded. Third, Congress should give the SEC
preemptive authority in order to ensure that conflicting state
regulations will not overly complicate the regulatory response.
Fourth, the SEC should be given explicit authority and direction to
create exemptions for this new class of security. In particular, the SEC
should be directed to create an exemption from registration for crypto
225. Under this definition, cryptoassets not convertible, directly or indirectly, into fiat
currency would not be securities and neither would any such interest that cannot
reasonably be foreseen to be of interest as a speculative investment. If “cryptoasset” was
added to the laundry list of things that count as a security in section 2 of the ‘33 Act, the
phrase “unless the context otherwise requires” might be sufficient to exclude those kinds
of interests from regulation as securities. Defining cryptoasset would, of course, be
preferable in order to avoid any potential confusion.
226. Jeremy Allaire, CEO and co-founder of Goldman Sachs-backed crypto finance
company Circle, has opined that the lack of clarity from the SEC over how crypto should
be defined is “[t]he biggest and most immediate regulatory hurdle” facing crypto today.
Marie Huillet, Circle CEO Says More Regulatory Clarity From US SEC Will Help Unlock
Crypto Markets, COINTELEGRAPH (Jan. 11, 2019) [https://perma.cc/6L3V-WLRW].
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offerings that disclose meaningful information about the token
project itself, rather than about the issuer. Obviously, the SEC would
then have to promulgate these exemptions. The next sections of this
Article examine each of these steps in turn.

A. A NEW DEFINITION OF SECURITY
As mentioned, the first step requires legislative intervention to
amend the federal securities laws227 to specifically include all
cryptoassets that are convertible, directly or indirectly, into fiat
currency228 so long as it is reasonably foreseeable that there is a
substantial likelihood229 that they will be sold for investment rather
than consumptive purposes.230

227. For example, section 2 of the Securities Act of 1933 and section 3 of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 would both need to be amended to add a new category of interests
to the current definition of “security.” 15 U.S.C. §§ 77(b) & 78(c), respectively. Other
securities laws would need similar updates. The list of items defined as a security could
simply be amended to add “cryptoassets,” and then the specific limits on the kinds of
assets that qualify could be included in a definition of the word “cryptoasset.”
228. Note that Bitcoin and Ether would both be securities under this approach.
Because a decentralized cryptoasset that is widely dispersed is not controlled by any
person or associated group of persons, the SEC should be expected to develop an
exemption for such assets. Both Bitcoin and Ether have been held not to fit under the
current regime, and statements have been made to the effect that there is little to be gained
by trying to impose securities registration requirements on them. See supra note 76 and
accompanying text. There is therefore little reason to suspect that the commission would
attempt to require registration or an exemption under an amended approach. This would,
however, leave in place the anti-fraud provisions for persons who are engaged in selling
these assets, which seems quite appropriate.
229. Securities lawyers may recognize part of this language. In considering the
question of materiality in the context of allegedly defective proxy disclosures, the U.S.
Supreme Court has held that “[a]n omitted fact is material if there is a substantial
likelihood that a reasonable shareholder would consider it important in deciding how to
vote.” TSC Indus., v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976). This formulation threaded
the needle between the overly lenient test of information that “might” be important and
the excessively restrictive test of information that “would” be important. The same
approach was adopted in the context of materiality in securities fraud cases in Basic Inc.
v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 231 (1988).
230. Claims are still being made that specific tokens are not securities at all. See
Stephen Brown, The Cryptocurrency World Deliberates On The Security Status Of Ripple’s
XRP, ZYCRYPTO (Dec. 12, 2018) [https://perma.cc/A7RP-KJ4Z]. Further muddying
already opaque waters, Penn State Law visiting Assistant Professor Michael O’Connor
has argued that the SEC is “wrong” in attempting to regulate crypto exchanges. Tom
Rodgers, Analysis: SEC Securities Definition of Crypto ‘Unlawful’, says Research, CRYPTO
NEWS REVIEW (Dec. 21, 2018) [https://perma.cc/84JT-P8U4]. It would greatly clarify
things to know that crypto is a security (just one with convenient and workable
exemptions from the registration requirement).
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Adding a new class of securities would resolve some of the
problems that are currently plaguing entrepreneurs and regulators
alike. It would no longer be necessary to apply the Howey test,
avoiding continued uncertainty and complexity.231 A straightforward
definition avoids the confusion created by a test that says some forms
of crypto may be securities at one time but at some future time may
no longer be securities, or even more confusingly, they may not be
securities initially but later might become subject to securities laws.232
This would simultaneously allow the SEC to shift resources to more
productive areas, such as considering disclosures that should apply
to the new class of interests, while providing certainty for
entrepreneurs. In addition, it would align the SEC’s approach more
closely with the positions taken by other countries, which tend to
refer to crypto as a cryptoasset rather than a digital asset.233
The requirement that the cryptoasset be convertible is consistent
with the approaches taken by the SEC, CFTC and FinCEN, all of
which recognize that a cryptoasset, digital asset, or virtual currency
that cannot be converted into conventional currency, either directly
or indirectly, and therefore cannot substitute for it, requires little in

231. To demonstrate the lack of clarity and consistency in the SEC’s definitional
approach to when cryptoassets are securities, see supra Part II.A.
232. A new framework for evaluating whether “digital assets” are securities was
announced by the SEC on April 3, 2019. See Framework, supra note 6. The framework
includes specific warnings that various conditions may make it necessary to reevaluate
“whether a digital asset previously sold as a security” might have become a security at
the time of later offers or sales. Id. at 5, 8.
233. As noted earlier, authorities in other countries tend to have adopted
“cryptoasset” as the appropriate label by which to refer to such assets. For example, in the
E.U., the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA), published advice to
European institutions in January 2019, acknowledging that cryptoassets with certain
characteristics are financial instruments and should be supervised as such, although this
requires action by individual countries in order to be effective. ESMA, Crypto-Assets Need
Common EU-Wide Approach to Ensure Investor Protection (Jan. 9, 2019) [https://perma.cc/
45CM-GHYE]. U.K. officials have also adopted this terminology. See Mike Orcutt,
Cryptocurrency is terrible as money but “crypto-assets” are for real, says Bank of England’s chief,
MIT TECH. REV. (Mar. 2, 2018) [https://perma.cc/CB4R-4MS5] (noting the Bank of
England Governor’s comments on the need for a measured response to crypto-assets).
Other international organizations use “cryptoassets” in their work as well. I.e., FSB, FSB
reports on work underway to address crypto-asset risks (May 31, 2019), https://www.fsb.org/
2019/05/fsb-reports-on-work-underway-to-address-crypto-asset-risks/. This report was
prepared for the G20 meeting of Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors, June 8–
9, 2019. A copy of the report can be found at FSB, Crypto-assets—Work underway, regulatory
approaches and potential gaps (May 31, 2019), https://www.fsb.org/wp-content/uploads/
P310519.pdf. See also FSB, Crypto-assets—Report to the G20 on Work by the FSB and StandardSetting Bodies, 1 (July 16, 2018) [https://perma.cc/E3E5-6NFG]. Cf. Framework, supra note
6.
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the way of regulation.234 Finally, any asset that has no investment
value does not carry the kind of risks that the SEC generally regulates.
It would further neither the goals of protecting capital markets nor
mainstream investors to impose existing requirements on crypto if
the assets have no speculative value.
Admittedly, a change in policy requiring that all cryptoassets be
classified and treated as securities is not likely to be universally
welcomed by crypto-entrepreneurs, but their concerns might be
mitigated by adoption of exemptions geared specifically toward
cryptoassets. The reality is that there are too many bad actors in the
crypto space and the costs associated with involvement of criminal
enterprises interested in bilking the investing public are too
significant for crypto to be unregulated.235 The current system, where
multiple regulatory agencies claim authority and where the new
assets are forced into existing rules and structures236 is clearly less
desirable than a single, more tailored approach.

B. EXCLUSIVITY OF JURISDICTION AND THE CFTC’S ROLE
Under the current regime, the SEC and CFTC have concurrent
jurisdiction over various aspects of cryptoassets.237 This is a result of
the SEC’s interpretation of the Howey investment contract test,238 and

234. See generally SEC, Public Statement, Leaders of CFTC, FinCEN, and SEC Issue Joint
Statement on Activities Involving Digital Assets (Oct. 11, 2019) [https://perma.cc/3S3Q9AF3].
235. See supra note 10.
236. As noted earlier at note 191, there are multiple federal and state authorities that
currently have jurisdiction over cryptoassets. At the federal level, the overlap between the
SEC and CFTC jurisdiction is probably the most problematic. See supra note 181 for an
explanation of the overlap. This point is also made in the next section of this Article.
237. “The Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) and the Commodity Futures
Trading Commission (“CFTC”) have both claimed ability to regulate this space, with the
SEC deeming virtual currencies to be securities by reason that they are investment
contracts and the CFTC looking to classify them as commodities.” Victor N.A. Metallo,
Are They Commodities or Securities? Virtual Currency Markets – Congress Must Create A New
Regulatory Entity, 8 WAKE FOREST L. REV. ONLINE 44 (Sept. 30, 2018). See also T. Gorman,
Blockchain, Virtual Currencies and the Regulators, DORSEY & WHITNEY LLP (Jan. 11, 2018),
https://www.secactions.com/blockchain-virtual-currencies-and-the-regulators/.
“As
the CFTC recently admitted, U.S. law does not provide for ‘direct comprehensive U.S.
regulation of virtual currencies. To the contrary a multi-regulatory approach is being
used.’”).
238. See supra notes 28-35 and accompanying text.
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the extremely broad definition of commodity in the Commodity
Exchange Act (CEA).239
In 2014, the CFTC first declared virtual currencies to be a
“commodity” subject to its authority under the CEA,240 and on
September 17, 2015, the CFTC issued its first administrative order
confirming the position that Bitcoin and other virtual currencies were
commodities under the CEA.241 In addition to various enforcement
actions involving derivatives,242 the CFTC has also claimed authority
to regulate fraud in the crypto spot markets.243 Originally, it claimed
such authority for fraud in connection with Bitcoin trades.244 This
makes sense under the current statutes because Bitcoin is an asset in
which futures are traded. However, the CFTC has also initiated anti-

239. Section 1(a)(9) of the Act defines “commodity” to include, among other things,
“all services, rights, and interests in which contracts for future delivery are presently or in
the future dealt in.” 7 U.S.C. § 1(a)(9). Not surprisingly, this has been broadly construed
to cover “virtual currencies,” which the CFTC has defined to include any “digital
representation of value that functions as a medium of exchange, a unit of account, and/or
a store of value.” CFTC, An Introduction to Virtual Currency [https://perma.cc/4CS92MJ9]. For a more complete description of the CFTC’s approach to crypto (which it calls
virtual currencies), see LabCFTC, A CFTC Primer on Virtual Currencies (Oct. 17, 2017)
[https://perma.cc/Y8YE-E2CE] (hereinafter Primer).
240. CFTC, Testimony of CFTC Chairman Timothy Massad before the U.S. Senate Committee
on
Agriculture,
Nutrition
and
Forestry
(Dec.
10,
2014),
http://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/SpeechesTestimony/opamassad-6).
241. CFTC, CFTC Orders Bitcoin Options Trading Platform Operator and its CEO to Cease
Illegally Offering Bitcoin Options and to Cease Operating a Facility for Trading or Processing of
Swaps
without
Registering,
REL.
N O.
7231-15
(Sept.
17,
2015),
https://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/PressReleases/pr7231-15. For additional details
about this action, see Conrad Bahlke, Recent Developments in the Regulatory Treatment of
Bitcoin, 28 No. 1 INTELL. PROP. & TECH. L.J. 6 (2016) (citations omitted).
242. See In re TeraExchange LLC, Dkt. No. 15-33 (CFTC Sept. 24, 2015),
http://www.cftc.gov/idc/groups/public/@lrenforcementactions/documents/legalple
ading/enfteraexchangeorder92415.pdf (action to prohibit wash trading and prearranged
trades on a crypto-derivatives platform); In re BXFNA Inc. d/b/a Bitfinex, Dkt. No. 16-19
(CFTC
June
2,
2016),
http://www.cftc.gov/idc/groups/public/@lrenforcementactions/documents/legalple
ading/enfbfxnaorder060216.pdf (action against unregistered Bitcoin futures exchange).
243. A “spot market,” also known as the actual or physical market, involves
transactions in the actual commodity rather than in derivative interests such as futures.
244. See, e.g., CFTC v. Gelfman Blueprint, Inc., Case No. 17–7181, 2017 WL 4228737
(S.D.N.Y. filed Sept. 21, 2017) (involving a Bitcoin Ponzi scheme). In 2018, the court ruled
in favor of the CFTC, ordering Gelfman to pay more than $2.5 million in civil monetary
penalties and restitution. CFTC, Federal Court Orders Trading Firm and CEO to Pay More
than $2.5 Million for Fraudulent Bitcoin Ponzi Scheme, REL. NO. 7831-18 (Oct. 18, 2018),
https://cftc.gov/PressRoom/PressReleases/7831-18 (“This case marks yet another
victory for the Commission in the virtual currency enforcement arena. As this string of
cases shows, the CFTC is determined to identify bad actors in these virtual currency
markets and hold them accountable.”).
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fraud actions against other cryptoassets in which no futures have ever
been traded or contemplated.245
In CFTC v. McDonnell,246 the CFTC alleged that Patrick
McDonnell and his company CabbageTech, Corp., dba Coin Drop
Markets, sold memberships in crypto trading groups by falsely
promising profits up to 300% per week.247 The CFTC specifically
asserted that it had “concurrent regulatory power over virtual
currency in certain settings . . ..” including the spot markets if fraud
is involved.248 The District Court for the Eastern District of New York
agreed,249 while noting that other administrative agencies such as the
SEC also have partial authority over cryptoassets.250
This decision is problematic not because it recognizes a division
of responsibility, but because it allows for a duplication of efforts.
While the CFTC, under the terms of the CEA, has exclusive
jurisdiction over most derivative contracts and exchanges that trade
such derivatives, it also has jurisdiction when there is fraud in the
spot markets for commodities.251 Normally this would not result in
245. CFTC v. McDonnell, 287 F. Supp. 3d 213, 216 (E.D.N.Y.), adhered to on denial of
reconsideration, 321 F. Supp. 3d 366 (E.D.N.Y. 2018).
246. Id.
247. Id. at 217.
248. Id. at 220 (citing testimony by the Chairman of the CFTC acknowledging that
“current law does not provide any U.S. Federal regulator with such regulatory oversight
authority over spot virtual currency platforms [not involving fraud] operating in the
United States or abroad.”).
249. Id. at 221, noting actions by the SEC such as SEC v. Plexcorps, 17–CV–7007, 2017
WL 5988934 (E.D.N.Y. Filed Dec. 1, 2017) (“This is an emergency action to stop Lacroix, a
recidivist securities law violator in Canada, and his partner Paradis-Royer, from further
misappropriating investor funds illegally raised through the fraudulent and unregistered
offer and sale of securities called ‘PlexCoin’ or ‘PlexCoin Tokens’ in a purported ‘Initial
Coin Offering.’”).
250. Christopher Giancarlo, Chairman Giancarlo Statement on Virtual Currencies, CFTC
(Jan. 4, 2018) (“One thing is certain: ignoring virtual currency trading will not make it go
away. Nor is it a responsible regulatory strategy. The CFTC has an important role to
play.”). Cited in McDonnell, 287 F. Supp. 3d at 221-222.
251. See 7 U.S.C. § 9 (banning the use of any “manipulative or deceptive device or
contrivance” in connection with the sale of a commodity); 17 C.F.R. § 180.1(a) (banning
the use of “any manipulative device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,” the making of “any
untrue or misleading statement of a material fact,” or the use of “any act, practice, or
course of business, which operates . . . as a fraud or deceit . . . .” in connection with the
sale of a commodity). There are several reported decisions from various court recognizing
the CFTC’s power to prosecute fraud under these provisions. See CFTC v. S. Tr. Metals,
Inc., 894 F.3d 1313, 1319, 1325, 1334 (11th Cir. 2018) (affirming judgment for CFTC in
“commodities-fraud case” alleging violations of Regulation 180.1 that “involve[d] no
allegation . . . that the Defendants manipulated the price of a commodity”); McDonnell,
287 F. Supp. 3d at 229 (“Language in 7 U.S.C. § 9(1), and 17 C.F.R. § 180.1, establish
the CFTC’s regulatory authority over the manipulative schemes, fraud, and
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significant duplication of efforts, but in the case of a commodity that
is a security, this can result in both the CFTC and SEC devoting
resources to address the same conduct.252 Even though both agencies
have indicated a desire to avoid over-regulation and work together,253
the CFTC and SEC continue to duplicate efforts.254
While one option to avoid duplication would be to leave the
matter to the CFTC, the reality is that agency has no experience in
establishing standards for the cash or spot market of commodities.
Since that is where most of the trading of Bitcoin and other
cryptoassets occurs, and because crypto is not well understood or
subject to self-regulation, it is especially important that the agency
overseeing crypto have appropriate experience and authority to

misleading statements alleged in the complaint.”), aff’d on reconsideration, 321 F. Supp. 3d
366, 2018 WL 3435047 at 368 (E.D.N.Y. 2018) (“Title 7 U.S.C. § 9(1) gives the CFTC standing
to exercise its enforcement power over the fraudulent schemes alleged in the
complaint.”); CFTC v. Hunter Wise Commodities, LLC, 21 F. Supp. 3d 1317, 1348 (S.D. Fla.
2014) (finding defendants liable for violating Section 6(c)(1) and Regulation 180.1 in fraud
case not involving allegations of market manipulation). But see CFTC v. Monex Credit Co.,
311 F. Supp. 3d 1173, 1185–89 (C.D. Cal. 2018) (finding that Section 6(c)(1) prohibits only
fraud-based market manipulation). In the specific context of cryptoassets, see CFTC v. My
Big Coin Pay, Inc., 334 F. Supp. 3d 492, 498–99 (D. Mass. 2018).
252. For example, on September 27, 2018, the SEC and CFTC filed parallel cases in the
same court against the same defendant. See SEC v. 1pool Ltd., No. 1:18-cv-02244 (D.D.C.
Sept. 27, 2018) and CFTC v. 1pool Ltd., No. 1:18-cv-02243 (D.D.C. Sept. 27, 2018).
253. See CFTC, CFTC and SEC Announce Approval of New MOU, REL. NO. 7745-18 (June
28, 2018), https://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/PressReleases/7745-18 (noting that the SEC
and CFTC “announced today that the two agencies have approved a Memorandum of
Understanding (MOU) that will help ensure continued coordination and information
sharing between the two agencies.”) In addition, both agencies have independently
proclaimed a desire not to stifle innovation in the crypto arena. See CFTC, Remarks of
Commissioner Brian Quintenz before the Eurofi High Level Seminar 2018 (Apr. 26, 2018),
https://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/SpeechesTestimony/opaquintenz11 (stating that “it
is incumbent upon regulators to create a workable and appropriate regulatory framework
that facilitates market-enhancing innovation. This means adopting regulation that is fair,
technology-neutral, and does not stifle positive innovations.”); Emily Gordy & Molly M.
White, SEC 2019 FinTech Forum, CONSUMER FINSIGHTS, MCGUIREWOODS (June 13, 2019)
[https://perma.cc/S462-J3NU] (“The SEC’s stated goal is to regulate without inhibiting
innovation.”).
254. Nikhilesh De, US Authorities Charge Crypto ‘Trading Club’ Operators With
Defrauding 150 Investors, COINDESK (Feb. 11, 2020), https://www.coindesk.com/usauthorities-charge-crypto-trading-club-operators-with-defrauding-150-investors (“The
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), the Commodity Futures Trading
Commission (CFTC) and the U.S Attorney for the Southern District of New York have
charged Ohio resident Michael Ackerman and two unnamed business partners with
defrauding some 150 investors by claiming to offer “extraordinary profits” from a
cryptocurrency trading scheme.”). The involvement of the U.S. Attorney General signifies
that the matter is criminal rather than civil and is not the same as having two agencies
responsible for the investigation of the same behaviors.
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promulgate requirements for compliant sales.255 Therefore, it makes
sense to use the SEC as the starting point for targeted regulation
outside the limited area of derivatives and exchanges for those
derivatives.

C. PREEMPTIVE AUTHORITY OVER STATE REGULATIONS
Another important component of productive change is to give
the SEC preemptive authority over state securities regulation of
cryptoassets. At the current time, every state retains authority to
regulate cryptoassets as securities if they so choose, and the reality is
that state treatment of crypto varies widely.256
Some states have issued guidance, opinion letters, or other
information from their financial regulatory agencies regarding
whether virtual currencies are “money” under existing state rules,
while others have enacted piecemeal legislation amending existing
definitions to either specifically include or exclude digital currencies
from the definition. To use a pun those in the blockchain space should
understand, there is a complete lack of consensus as to whether they
do or not.257
By way of example, Wyoming is widely recognized as being the
most pro-crypto U.S. state.258 The Wyoming statutes exempt “digital

255. Timothy G. Massad, It’s Time to Strengthen the Regulation of Crypto-Assets CryptoAssets,
ECONOMIC
STUDIES
AT
BROOKINGS,
32-33
(Mar.
2019),
https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/Timothy-Massad-ItsTime-to-Strengthen-the-Regulation-of-Crypto-Assets-2.pdf (“When it comes to many
commodities, such as oil or wheat, the fact that the CFTC does not have authority to set
standards for the cash market is usually not critical, because the cash market has
developed standards and norms over decades and may even be subject to other regulatory
oversight. But the cash market for crypto-assets—which is where most of the trading takes
place today—does not have well-developed standards.”).
256. As one source explains, “all states can assert jurisdiction over securities
transactions involving crypto-related subject matter because there is no blanket federal
jurisdictional preemption in securities regulation.” Bryan K. Prosek & John R. Chadd, State
Securities Regulators Are Increasing Actions Against Cryptocurrency Issuers and Exchanges,
NAT. L. REV (Nov. 28, 2018) [https://perma.cc/9JDZ-SCND]. The result is a patchwork of
inconsistent approaches. Id.
257. Matthew E. Kohen & Justin S. Wales, State Regulations on Virtual Currency and
Blockchain Technologies—(Updated), CARLTON FIELDS (Oct. 17, 2017; updated Apr. 19, 2019),
https://www.carltonfields.com/insights/publications/2018/state-regulations-onvirtual-currency-and-blockchain-technologies.
258. Caitlan Long, What Do Wyoming’s 13 New Blockchain Laws Mean?, FORBES (Mar. 4,
2019),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/caitlinlong/2019/03/04/what-do-wyomingsnew-blockchain-laws-mean/#789ad4785fde.
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consumer assets” from the definition of a digital security.259 “Digital
consumer asset” is defined as “a digital asset that is used or bought
primarily for consumptive, personal or household purposes” other
than as a virtual currency that is to be used “as a medium of exchange,
unit of account or store of value.”260
Montana is also regarded as have a pro-crypto securities regime,
but its statutes provide an exemption for utility tokens whose
purpose is primarily consumptive. 261 The specifics of this exemption
require an issuer to prove that it has marketed the token for
consumptive purposes and “does not market the utility token to be
used for a speculative or investment purpose.”262 In addition, the
utility token must be available at the time of the sale or within 180
days so long as the initial buyers knowingly agree that their purchase
is for consumption and that no resales are permitted until the
functionality of the token is available.263
In contrast, not every jurisdiction has enacted exemptive or
exclusionary language for any kind of crypto assets or offerings. For
example, on January 3, 2019, the North Dakota House introduced a
bill which would have exempted “an open blockchain token from
specified securities transactions and dealings.”264 The bill was,
however, defeated on January 11, 2019. The Rhode Island House
similarly proposed a bill that, among other things, would have
exempted virtual currency from securities requirements.265 The bill
was referred to the House Finance Committee and died there.
Naturally, there are a number of arguments that can be made in
favor and against federal preemption generally:
Arguments commonly made in favor of federal preemption in a
particular area include the creation of a uniform national standard,
ease of commerce in markets of a national or global nature, and the
concentration of expertise with a single federal regulator . . .
Arguments against federal preemption generally include
encouragement of policy experimentation, democratic accountability

259.
260.
261.
262.
263.
264.
265.

WYO. STAT. ANN. § 34–29–101(a)(iii).
Id. at §§ 34–29–101(a)(ii) & (iv).
MONT. CODE ANN. § 30–10–105(23).
Id. at § 30-10-105(23)(a)(ii).
Id. at § 30-10-105(23)(a)(iv).
H.B. 1043, 2019 66th Leg. Assemb., (N.D. 2019) [https://perma.cc/RE22-D5XK].
2019 RI H5776 (NS) (Feb. 28, 2019). – 2020 RI H7989 (March 11, 2020).
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and maintaining the regulator as close as possible to the regulated
entities.266
In the context of cryptoassets, which are not local in character
and where over-regulation runs the risk of stifling technological
innovation, the advantages of preemption would appear to outweigh
the disadvantages.
It is noteworthy that this would not be the first time that the
federal securities laws will have preempted inconsistent state
securities regulation. The National Securities Market Improvement
Act of 1996 (NSMIA)267 included the first express federal preemption
of state blue-sky laws. NSMIA grants the SEC broad authority to
preempt state regulation over any offerings to “qualified
purchasers,” requiring only that the definition of that phrase be
“consistent with the public interest and the protection of investors.”268
Nonetheless, the SEC has not generally taken advantage of this
authority, which is why this Article suggests that Congress direct
such preemption.269

D. NEW EXEMPTIONS
Assuming the SEC is given exclusive and preemptive authority
over cryptoassets as a new category of securities, it is also important
that the agency be directed to establish appropriate, targeted
standards for distributions of cryptoassets. While antifraud
requirements can and should continue to be enforced based on the
history of fraudulent distributions involving crypto,270 Congress
should direct the SEC to promulgate exemptions from the registration
requirements for various kinds of crypto.

266. Philip C. Berg, State vs. Federal Laws in Cryptocurrency: Blue Sky, or Running in the
Red? MEDIUM (Dec. 4, 2018) [https://perma.cc/6A4S-F6YC].
267. National Securities Market Improvement Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104–29, 110 Stat.
3416 (Oct. 11, 1996) (the text of the law is available online at
https://www.congress.gov/104/plaws/publ290/PLAW-104publ290.pdf).
268. 15 U.S.C. § 77r(b)(3).
269. Rutheford B. Campbell, The Role of Blue Sky Laws After NSMIA and the JOBS Act,
66 DUKE L.J. 605, 617 (2016). “State regulators have vigorously and seemingly with
renewed energy opposed the expansion of preemption. The Commission, on the other
hand, has been unwilling to any significant degree to promote preemption.”
270. Creative criminals have already found myriad ways to abuse the crypto markets;
there is no reason to suspect this will stop. See Tyler Elliot Bettilyon, Cryptocurrency’s
Criminal
Revolution,
MEDIUM
(Jul.
12,
2018),
https://medium.com/s/story/cryptocurrencys-criminal-revolution-6dae3cdf630f.
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It is true that the SEC already has broad authority to promulgate
exemptions from registration for classes of securities “to the extent
that such exemption is necessary or appropriate in the public interest,
and is consistent with the protection of investors.”271
Notwithstanding this authority, the need for a Congressional
mandate is clear since the SEC has shown no inclination to adopt new
regulations, choosing instead to regulate based on preexisting rules.
Congress could choose to amend section 4 of the Securities Act
of 1933272 to add a new exemption from registration for cryptoassets,
with the exception of tokenized securities that provide investors with
governance rights and/or profits in the issuer/creator or provide for
redemption at a profit or with interest to be paid by the issuer.273
(Those should be treated in the same way as other equity or debt
securities, and ordinary registration or exemption alternatives and
conditions should apply.) Rather than spelling out the terms of such
an exemption, the new statutory provision could provide for
exemptions that cover such sales as the Commission may, by
regulation, provide. The SEC could then seek input from industry
about the parameters of the exemptions.
Presumably, a new exemption for forms of crypto that cannot be
characterized as tokenized debt or equity would be conditioned upon
disclosure of certain information relevant to the value of the crypto
(and not particularly the business of the issuer outside that context),274
as specified by the SEC. This could include information such as the
qualifications and background of any token development team (not
of the issuer’s management as current forms emphasize), with more

271. 15 U.S.C. § 77z-3 (granting the SEC general exemptive authority:
The Commission, by rule or regulation, may conditionally or unconditionally exempt any
person, security, or transaction, or any class or classes of persons, securities, or
transactions, from any provision or provisions of this subchapter or of any rule or
regulation issued under this subchapter, to the extent that such exemption is necessary or
appropriate in the public interest, and is consistent with the protection of investors.)
272. 15 U.S.C. § 77d (dealing with exempted transactions).
273. Those kinds of crypto would essentially be tokenized forms of traditional debt or
equity securities and could be treated under existing provisions of the law without the
need for a new exemption. Moreover, the new exemption would not adequately protect
investors who believe they are obtaining a debt or equity stake in a business as disclosures
would not adequately convey information about the entity in which a purchaser would
be investing.
274. Note that this is a change from the current regulatory disclosure model, which
specifically references the need to disclose information not merely about the security
being issued but also about the company (a requirement that makes sense only if there is
to be an investment in the company itself). See supra Part II of this Article.
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detail being required if the token is pre-functional.275 It could also
include a description of how outstanding coins or tokens were issued
or pre-mined, and for what consideration, along with information
about the extent to which the issuer and those affiliated with the
token project retain ownership of any of those outstanding interests.
A possible starting point for the kinds of disclosures is to
consider who would be required to make them. For cryptoassets
being sold by or in connection with a development team, the
disclosures might include response to the following kinds of
questions. What is the intended function of the token? How far along
is it in development? Who is working on the development, and what
are their qualifications? How will the token be issued? How many
coins or tokens have been pre-mined or distributed, and for what
consideration? Is there a cap on the total number of tokens to be
created, and if so, what is it? Can the cap be changed? How disperse
is the ownership of the token? How many of the outstanding tokens
are owned by the issuer, the team creating the asset, or an affiliate of
such person(s)? What will be the policies on hard forks? How are
errors or weaknesses in the protocol to be addressed or remedied?
Under what circumstances will transactions be reversed or stopped?
What privacy protocols are in place, and are they mandatory or
optional? Who will be working on promotion of the coin or token?
Are there restrictions or limitations on resale? Are there existing
exchanges that accept the asset? If not, will anyone be working on
finding an exchange or trading platform that will include the coin or
token among their interests? Note that answering these questions
would require disclosures very similar to those proposed by SEC
Commissioner Hester Peirce’s as part of suggestion that the SEC
adopt a 3-year safe harbor.276
This Article suggests that particular plans for or limits on
transferability and liquidity should also be part of the required
disclosures, particularly if non-accredited investors are involved.
(This is different from the Peirce proposal, which would be limited to
tokens that are designed to be liquid.)277 In addition, the greater the
amount to be raised, the more detailed the required disclosures can
reasonably be expected to be, although the SEC should learn from its

275. A pre-functional token is a cryptoasset that is not fully functional as of its launch,
or in other words, it lacks completed programming upon issuance.
276. See supra notes 214-20 and accompanying text.
277. Peirce, Empty, supra note 214.
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Regulation CF rules278 and avoid setting fundraising limits that are
unrealistically low or imposing unduly burdensome ongoing
reporting requirements.
The ‘33 Act should also be amended to address what occurs
when the person selling the token is not the actual developer. For
someone not engaged in regular sales, or the business of profiting
from speculation in crypto, it may be appropriate to have a specific
exemption, because it is not always clear who will count as an issuer
and therefore who would count as an underwriter. For persons who
are engaged in the business of selling crypto, or who own a significant
amount of a particular token, different kinds of disclosures may be
required. For these kinds of sellers, important questions may include
how many tokens the seller owns or controls, any connection to the
issuer or developer(s), and what communications the seller has made
or directed others to make that are designed to influence the pricing
of the token. These persons may not have the other kinds of
information that would be accessible to developers or conventional
issuers of securities, so the required disclosures need to be
appropriately tailored.
The point of this discussion is not to fully describe the
exemptions that need to be drafted. That is a process best informed
by the notice and comment process that federal agencies such as the
SEC are directed to follow. However, a legislative mandate is needed
at this point to ensure that the commission does indeed adopt
changes to help balance the need for investor protection with the
legitimate needs of crypto entrepreneurs.

E. RECAP OF RECOMMENDATIONS
The proposal outlined in this Article would result in the
following changes.
i. From the Regulators’ Perspectives
278. Regulation CF was designed to allow smaller entities to conduct crowdfunded
securities offerings. See SEC, Regulation Crowdfunding: A Small Entity Compliance Guide for
Issuers
(May
13,
2016
with
Apr.
5,
2017
updates),
https://www.sec.gov/info/smallbus/secg/rccomplianceguide-051316.htm.
It
was
originally limited to offerings that did not exceed $1,000,000 in any 12-month period,
although that amount is now at $1,070,000. Because of the low offering limit, few Reg CF
offerings have been conducted, prompting the SEC to propose raising the limit to
$5,000,000. For a discussion of this proposal, see SEC Proposed Major Changes to Regulation
Crowdfunding (Reg CF), INFRASHARES (Mar. 13, 2020) [https://perma.cc/Y3E3-VD8B].
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The most important benefit of these changes from the SEC’s
perspective is that it would no longer need to spend resources
litigating what is a security. By specifically including cryptoassets in
the definition, the time and resources spent on trying to clarify or
arguing about whether the securities laws apply to crypto would
come to an end. This would give the SEC additional time and
resources to provide more accurate warnings about crypto fraud. It
would also allow the SEC to focus more of its attention on fraud,
without needing to coordinate with or worry about overlapping with
the CFTC’s enforcement efforts.
In addition, the SEC would be better able to accomplish its
mission of facilitating capital formation and avoiding the risk of
stifling innovation by having the impetus and resources to craft more
focused disclosures for these kinds of assets. Because crypto is a
security, this would not compromise the commission’s ability to
protect the public from fraudulent transactions, making the option a
win-win.
From the perspective of other regulators, the CFTC would no
longer be called upon to regulate in the crypto spot markets, and state
securities regulators would also be free to focus on fraudulent activity
without needing to regulate the process of registration or exemptions.
ii. From the Entrepreneur’s Perspective
The benefits to crypto-entrepreneurs would seem to be relatively
obvious. Instead of needing to coordinate with both the CFTC and
SEC at the federal level, there would be a single regulator. In addition,
and more importantly, they could expect (and have input into the
creation of) reasonable and targeted exemptions and disclosure
regimes. This should mean that crypto-developers would no longer
be forced out of the U.S. markets or out of the realm of innovation
altogether. Similarly, other crypto-based businesses such as
exchanges and investment advisors should be able to develop
strategies for compliance with regulatory requirements once
appropriate rules are in place.
iii. From the Public Investor’s Perspective
As for investors, they would still be as protected from fraud. In
fact, the SEC should have additional resources to focus on this kind
of problem. At the same time, persons desiring to participate as an
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investor in the crypto markets could expect more opportunities for
investment. This would also be facilitated by the expansion of cryptobased businesses such as exchanges and investor services enterprises,
which can be expected when there is a reasonable path to regulatory
compliance.
VI. CONCLUSION
The result of the proposal presented in this Article could be a
regime that appropriately assigns responsibilities to the SEC and
recognizes its expertise and superior position when it comes to
knowledge about systemic risks associated with cryptoassets. Under
this approach, the SEC should be able to satisfy both parts of its
mission: protection of the public and facilitating innovative capital
formation. As a consequence of these changes in regulatory direction,
the U.S. should wind up with a fairer and more efficient disclosure
regime suitable for both the issuer and investors. Finally, investors
would be recognized as being responsible for their own decisions. To
the extent that it is their decision where to store and exchange their
crypto, they should be responsible for the risks of cyber failures. They
should also accept the risk of problems such as those caused by
market volatility, and other risks that are outside the control of any
particular person.
The thrust of this Article is not that regulation of cryptoassets is
unnecessary or that the SEC is the wrong regulator for the developing
technology. However, the current system creates a number of issues
that could be resolved with legislative intervention. These include the
current resources that are devoted to trying to apply the Howey test,
the awkwardness of applying existing disclosure obligations to an
asset that simply works differently than conventional securities, and
a regulatory focus that duplicates efforts.
As a result of the inefficiencies and uncertainties associated with
the current regime, potential issuers are prevented from offering
potentially valuable interests or from funding potentially viable
businesses because of the cost of regulatory compliance, and
investors are foreclosed from opportunities in which they may desire
to participate. Even entrepreneurs who elect to proceed with
offerings are often driven out of the U.S. or forced to pass along
unnecessarily higher costs to potential purchasers. Investors who
think they are being protected by current disclosure requirements are
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not, because the most relevant information is either not provided or
buried in so much other information that it is not accessible.
Making it clear that crypto is a security (and therefore subject to
the anti-fraud provisions of the federal securities laws), but
presumptively exempting it from the requirements of registration
seems to be the most efficient approach. An exemption from
registration does not mean that no disclosures are required, but
instead it allows the disclosure paradigm of a generally available
exemption to focus on the actual concerns that are likely to be most
relevant to potential purchasers. It will allow the SEC take resources
away from the focus on “when is crypto a security,” and direct them
instead to “what kinds of information do purchasers of crypto
reasonably need to know, that issuers/developers can reasonably be
expected to provide”? That seems to be a far more efficient and
productive utilization of resources than is currently being witnessed.
Obviously, as is the case with current exemptions, if a
distribution is accomplished through fraud or deception, with
misleading or inaccurate information in the offering or advertising
materials, a cause of action for fraud should still be available. But for
compliant issuers, a different approach would definitely seem to be
superior to the current regulatory structures that leaves too many
possible crypto developers with the equivalent of bleeding feet
crammed into an ill-fitting slipper.
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